The demand for teachers by public school districts under three different market structures by Pate, David S.
Retrospective Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses andDissertations
1985
The demand for teachers by public school districts
under three different market structures
David S. Pate
Iowa State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd
Part of the Labor Economics Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Retrospective Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Pate, David S., "The demand for teachers by public school districts under three different market structures " (1985). Retrospective
Theses and Dissertations. 8738.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd/8738
INFORMATION TO USERS 
This reproduction was made from a copy of a manuscript sent to us for publication 
and microfilming. While the most advanced technology has been used to pho­
tograph and reproduce this manuscript, the quality of the reproduction is heavily 
dependent upon the quality of the material submitted. Pages in any manuscript 
may have indistinct print. In all cases the best available copy has been filmed. 
The following explanation of techniques is provided to help clarify notations which 
may appear on this reproduction. 
1. Manuscripts may not always be complete. When it is not possible to obtain 
missing pages, a note appears to indicate this. 
2. When copyrighted materials are removed from the manuscript, a note ap­
pears to indicate this. 
3. Oversize materials (maps, drawings, and charts) are photographed by sec­
tioning the original, beginning at the upper left hand comer and continu­
ing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. E)ach oversize 
page is also filmed as one exposure and is available, for an additional 
charge, as a standard 35mm slide or in black and white paper format.* 
4. Most photographs reproduce acceptabty on positive microfilm or micro­
fiche but lack clarity on xerographic copies made from the microfilm. For 
an additional charge, all photographs are available in black and white 
standard 35mm slide format.* 
*For more information about black and white slides or enlarged paper reproductions, 
please contact the Dissertations Customer Sendees Department. 
ME Uiiivemly Mkroohns =. Internatkœal 

8604508 
Pate, David S. 
THE DEMAND FOR TEACHERS BY PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICTS UNDER 
THREE DIFFERENT MARKET STRUCTURES 
Iowa State University PH.D. 1985 
University 
Microfilms 
internâtionâ! 300 N. Zeeb Poaa. Ann Arbor, Ml 46106 

The demand for teachers by public school districts 
under three different market structures 
by 
David S. Pate 
A Dissertation Submitted to the 
Graduate Faculty in Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the Degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
Major: Economics 
Approved: 
Jri Charge of Major Work 
For the Major Department
Iowa State University 
Ames, Iowa 
1985 
Signature was redacted for privacy.
Signature was redacted for privacy.
Signature was redacted for privacy.
ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
I. INTRODUCTION 1 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 5 
III. MODEL OF THE SCHOOL DISTRICT AS A PRICE TAKER 21 
A. Derivation of the Demand Function for Teacher Services 21 
B. Model Estimation 29 
1. Introduction 29 
2. Data description 31 
3. Estimation techniques 35 
4. Estimation of the demand for teachers 39 
5. Estimation of the demand for elementary and 
secondary teachers 49 
6. Estimation of the demand for teacher experience 65 
7. Estimation of the demand for teacher educational 
preparation 76 
C. Summary 81 
IV. DETERMINATION OF THE TEACHER-STUDENT RATIO AND THE PRICE 
FUNCTION OF TEACHER SERVICES USING HEDONIC METHODOLOGY 
TO MODEL TEACHER-SCHOOL DISTRICT TRANSACTIONS 87 
A. Model 
1. Introduction 87 
2. Price-characteristics function 89 
3. Teacher behavior 90 
4. School district behavior 92 
B. Model Estimation 94 
1. Functional forms 94 
2. Empirical results 98 
3. Conclusion 107 
V. SCHOOL DISTRICTS AS MONOPSONISTS IN THE MARKET FOR 
TEACHER SERVICES 109 
A. Introduction 109 
ill 
Page 
B. Teacher and School District Behavior 112 
1. Teacher supply 112 
2. Teacher demand 113 
3. Monopsonist model 114 
C. Model Estimation 116 
1. Functional forms 116 
2. Empirical results 121 
D. Conclusion 130 
VI. SUMMARY 133 
A. Overview of the Empirical Results 133 
B. Policy Implications 135 
C. Future Research 137 
VII. REFERENCES 140 
VIII. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 143 
1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Â better understanding of the personnel decisions made by public 
school systems and the market forces that shape these decisions is 
desirable because of its relevance to several public policy issues. This 
study attempts to further this understanding by examining the demand for 
teachers and for two measures of teacher quality, education and 
experience levels, by Maryland public school districts for the 1955-1956 
through 1979-1980 school years. 
In estimating demand functions for teacher services by school 
districts, the responsiveness of the quantity of teacher services 
demanded to the price of teacher services will be measured. Knowledge of 
the elasticity of demand for teacher services should be of interest to 
school board members and local government officials to the extent that 
they desire to minimize the cost of local government services. Current 
educational expenses take up a large part of the budget of local govern­
ments and the salaries of educational employees comprise a large part of 
these current education expenses. Thus, any force that puts upward 
pressure on teacher salaries will have a significant impact on current 
educational expenditures. This would leave local government officials 
with the unpopular options of raising local tax revenues or cutting back 
on other locally provided services 
A teachers' union is one such force to put upward pressure on 
teacher salaries. The determination of teacher salaries within the 
framework of a collective bargaining agreement between school boards and 
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teachers' unions has become commonplace. One determinant of the 
intensity with which teachers' unions are likely to push for salary 
increases is the elasticity of demand for teacher services. The more 
inelastic the demand for teacher services, the more attractive it will be 
to the union to push for salary increases as there will be a smaller 
decrease in the quantity of teacher services demanded for any given level 
of wage increase. 
A second issue involves the perceived decline in the quality of 
public education in the United States. This decline has been partially 
attributed to the decline in the quality of public school teachers. It 
is suggested that many of the better teachers have left public school 
teaching for work in the private sector in response to better wages and 
working conditions. It is further suggested that many of the better 
quality college students have opted for curricula other than education 
for the same reason. Insofar as this study will attempt to provide a 
better understanding of the process determining the stock of teachers 
within a public school district, it may provide suggestions towards cost-
efficient routes to improve the quality of public education. 
A final issue is the choice of a proper formula for the determina­
tion of state educational aid to school districts. One justification for 
the provision of state funds to local school districts is that if such 
funding is properly distributed among school districts within the state, 
students will face equal educational opportunities regardless of the 
public school district they attend. This can be illustrated by 
considering a situation where school districts rely solely on local 
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property tax revenues for funds. Suppose that educational opportunities 
to students are positively related to the educational inputs of the 
school district to which they belong. Examples of educational inputs 
include the quality and size of the teacher stock as well as the physical 
facilities of the school system. Further, suppose that all school 
districts within the state face the same prices for educational inputs. 
School districts that have greater levels of assessable wealth per pupil 
can provide their students with more educational opportunities for a 
given level of tax effort (local property tax rate) than can less wealthy 
districts. To remedy this situation, state educational aid programs have 
been enacted to ensure that for a given level of tax effort, school 
districts have an equal ability to provide their students with a state-
determined, minimum acceptable level of educational opportunity. One 
requirement that must be satisfied by the aid formula if the program is 
to achieve its purpose is that it must account for any differences in the 
price of educational inputs faced by school districts within the state. 
This study will examine the extent to which the price of teacher services 
vary within the state of Maryland and will attempt to identify the source 
of such variation. 
Previous studies of teacher demand have been conducted by Boardman, 
Darling-Hammond, and Mullin (1982), Wentzler (1981), Hall and Carroll 
(1973), Ehrenberg (1973), and Brown (1972). By building on previous 
work, this study will attempt to resolve some of the theoretical and 
empirical issues that have arisen in the studies mentioned above, as well 
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as providing a better understanding of the determination of a school 
district's teaching stock for public policy purposes. 
The remainder of this dissertation will proceed as follows. 
Chapter II will review the five studies of teacher demand. Attention 
will be focused on the theoretical structure employed and the empirical 
results of each paper. Chapter III models the school district's demand 
for teacher services under the assumption that the school district is a 
price taker in the market for teacher services and thus faces a perfectly 
elastic supply of teacher services at the market determined price. The 
data set employed by this study is described along with the empirical 
results of the econometric model. Chapter IV examines one case which 
would cause the price of teacher services to be endogenous to the school 
district. The supply of teacher services is assumed to be responsive to 
not only the wage offer, but also to the amenities and disamenities of 
the job. Within this hedonic approach, class size, a choice variable of 
the school district, is one of the job characteristics that teachers 
respond to. Thus, a simultaneous equations system is used to test if the 
price and quantity of teacher services are jointly determined by the 
school district. Chapter V also examines the possibility that the price 
and quantity of teacher services are jointly determined by the school 
district, this time postulating that this situation arises from the 
school district possessing a degree of monopsony power in the market for 
teacher services. Chapter VI provides a brief overview of the empirical 
results of the previous chapters, comments on their policy implications, 
and suggests directions for further research in this area. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of this section is to review recent studies that examine 
the demand for teachers by public school districts. Four aspects of each 
article will be dealt with. First, the goal of the study and in light of 
this goal, the issues addressed by the paper are described. Next, the 
view that each takes of the output from the educational process is 
mentioned. Third, the theoretical framework employed to describe the 
determination of the price and quantity of teacher services is set forth. 
Finally, the type of data, the empirical techniques used, and the 
relevant findings of the study are briefly summarized. 
Hall and Carroll (1973) investigated the effect that collective 
bargaining had on wage levels and class size among Chicago-area school 
districts during the 1968-1969 school year. They felt that to discover 
the true impact of unions in the public school setting, it was necessary 
to view teachers' organizations as negotiating to achieve both financial 
goals and work conditions. Class size was seen as an important component 
of working conditions. Hall and Carroll postulated that schools produce 
educational quality and in an ad hoc fashion described it as being 
functionally related to class size (average number of students per 
teacher), the percent of per pupil expenditures paid by the state, the 
presence of a collective bargaining agreement, teacher salaries, and two 
measures of community characteristics, population and percent white-
collar workers. They also set up an ad hoc functional relationship 
between teacher salaries and district characteristics including class 
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size and the presence of a collective bargaining agreement. Hall and 
Carroll used two-stage least squares with their cross sectional data to 
estimate teacher salaries and average class size. Given the nature of 
their model, the interpretation and reliability of their estimates are 
questionable. However, they did find that class size has a significant, 
positive effect on salaries, while salaries had a significant, positive 
effect on class size. 
A paper by Wentzler (1981) examined differences in the price of 
teacher services across Wisconsin school districts during the 1974-1975 
school year. Wentzler was concerned with the effect of state education 
aid formulas on the ability of state educational aid programs to insure 
equality of educational opportunity across school districts within a 
state. The issue can be briefly described as follows. Suppose that 
school districts rely completely on local funding, say through a local 
property tax, and also assume that all school districts face the same 
prices of educational inputs. Wealthier districts are able to provide 
more resources to public education for a given tax effort (property tax 
rate) than are less wealthy districts, resulting in unequal educational 
opportunities for students across the state. A state educational aid 
plan that insures that school districts possess the same ability to 
provide education to their students for the same tax effort, regardless 
of local wealth, provides a degree of equality of educational opportunity 
to students within the sate. If the cost of educational inputs varies 
across school districts, the state educational aid formula must take this 
into account if the program is to achieve its goal. Wentzler attempted 
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to identify characteristics of school districts that influence the price 
of educational inputs they face. She focused on the supply price of 
teachers as teacher compensation makes up the bulk of current educational 
expense for school districts (Wentzler, 1981, p. 434). 
Wentzler asserted that school districts produce educational 
services. These services are not identified, but are assumed to be 
produced according to a well-behaved production function which has as its 
arguments quantities of different types of teachers and a vector of other 
inputs not subject to the school administrator's control. The amount of 
educational services to be produced is determined through a median-voter 
framework. The function of the school district administrator is to 
provide this level of educational services at the minimum cost. Teacher 
supply to the district is derived through a household production model. 
Although not explicitly stated, Wentzler's model implied that school 
districts possess a degree of monopsony power as the supply price faced 
by each district was determined by the quantity of teacher services along 
with the quality of teacher services and measures of the district's 
amenities and disamenities. 
Wentzler estimated the demand and supply functions for elementary 
and secondary teachers by two-stage least squares. She found that the 
demand for teachers at both levels decreased as the price of teacher 
services increased while the supply price of teachers increased with the 
quantity of teachers. Both results were statistically significant. 
Wentzler made no mention of the latter result which implied that school 
districts possess a degree of monopsony power. If one accepts this 
8 
interpretation of her results, estimation of a demand function for 
teachers was inappropriate as a monopsonist does not possess a true 
demand curve. It would have been proper to estimate a reduced-form 
equation for the number of teachers hired although this was not done. 
Boardman, Darling-Hammond, and Mullin (1982) also addressed the 
issue of school finance reform. Their goal was to explain the sources of 
differences in the prices of teacher services faced by Pennsylvania 
school districts during the 1974-1975 school year. Boardman et al. 
viewed schools as multiproduct firms. Outputs of the schooling process 
include student achievement and the acquisition of self-esteem and 
societal values. A school district was assumed to be concerned with the 
average level of and the variance in each output across all students. 
The school district services an area coterminous with the jurisdic­
tion of the local county government. Through a framework consistent with 
the median-voter hypothesis, the taxing and spending decisions of the 
county government officials were assumed to maximize the social welfare 
of the county's residents. These officials determine the level of 
educational services to be provided by the public school system, the 
levels of other services to be provided by the county government, and the 
level of after-tax income available to residents with which to privately 
purchase goods and services. Thus, the demand for teacher services was 
derived at the margin from their impact on social welfare through their 
contribution to the production of educational services. 
Boardman et al. examine three cases, two of which are of relevant 
concern here. First, teacher demand was modeled under the assumption 
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that school districts are price takers in the market for teacher 
services. In the second case, school districts were assumed to possess a 
degree of monopsony power. The data describe 504 Pennsylvania school 
districts for the 1974-1975 school year and were not broken down into 
elementary and secondary levels. 
Assuming the school district to be a price taker in the input 
market, teacher demand was estimated as a function of the price of 
teacher services, the price of alternative goods which the county govern­
ment could supply, variables describing the resources and tastes of 
county residents, and variables describing student and school district 
characteristics. The demand for teachers was found to be unaffected by 
the price of teacher services, measured by the average teacher salary. 
They also found that both the demand for teachers of higher education 
levels, presumably those with a master's degree or Ph.D., and the demand 
for experienced teachers increased the higher was the price of teacher 
services. 
Next, under the assumption that school districts possess a degree of 
monopsony power, the teacher supply price was estimated using two-stage 
least squares as a function of the quantity of teachers and of student, 
teacher, and school district characteristics. Boardman et al. found that 
the quantity of teachers had a positive and significant affect on teacher 
supply price, indicating that school districts possess a degree of 
monopsony power. 
Brown (1972) also addressed the issue of promoting equal educational 
opportunity through the public school system. He examined whether 
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cognitive achievement was a measurable output of Michigan school 
districts and then attempted to describe school districts' behavior in 
pursuit of their goals. Brown questioned whether the practice of 
providing school districts with state money so that they can purchase 
additional educational inputs serves any useful purpose. He found no 
consistent positive relationship between the levels of educational inputs 
of school districts and the cognitive achievement of fourth grade 
students within those districts. 
Brown next described a model of school district behavior from which 
the demand function for teachers was derived. In his model, school 
district officials maximize the district's welfare by allocating their 
budget, consisting of local revenues and state aid, among purchases of 
educational inputs and purchases of other goods and services for public 
provision. The exact nature of the output of the school district was not 
explicitly stated. The amount of "education" provided by the school 
district is produced according to an educational production function 
which has as its arguments purchased inputs, including teacher services, 
the number of students, and measures of student characteristics. The 
school district was assumed to be a price taker in the market for teacher 
services. The district's demand function for teacher services was 
derived form the district's demand for "education." The arguments of the 
demand function are the number of students, student characteristics, the 
school district's budget, the price of teacher services, and the price of 
other publicly provided goods and services. 
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Brown (1972) used data from 636 Michigan school districts from the 
1970-1971 school year. The data set was not broken down into elementary 
and secondary levels. Demand functions for the student-teacher ratio, 
the percentage of teachers with a master's degree, and the average years 
of experience of the school district's instructional staff were estimated 
using the statewide sample and then were estimated for four subsamples— 
cities, urban fringe areas, towns, and rural districts. Ordinary least 
squares was used in all cases. 
Brown found in all cases except school districts in urban fringe 
areas that the class size demanded increased as the average teacher 
salary increased. The average teacher salary had an insignificant effect 
on school districts in the urban fringe areas. However, the average 
teacher salary did not have the expected effect on the demand for 
teachers with a master's degree nor on the demand for teacher experience. 
Teacher salary had no significant effect on the demand for teachers with 
a master's degree in school districts located in cities or rural 
districts while it had a positive and significant effect on the demand 
for teachers with a master's degree using the statewide sample and the 
other two subgroups. Average teacher salary had no significant effect on 
the demand for average teacher experience by school districts located in 
cities. For the statewide sample and the other three subgroups, the 
demand for teacher experience increased as the average teacher salary 
increased. Brown suggested that the average teacher salary may be a poor 
measure of the actual salary schedule and that it may be endogenous as it 
reflects the mix of teachers chosen by the school district. 
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Ehrenberg (1973) measured Che wage elasticity of demand for state 
and local government employees. This measure is of interest in that an 
inelastic demand for public sector employees would make it more attrac­
tive to public sector employee unions to push for higher member wages, 
all else equal. The wage elasticity of demand for state and local 
employees engaged in public education along with the wage elasticities of 
demand for ten other functional categories of public sector employees 
was estimated. 
Ehrenberg modeled a single decision maker who derives utility from 
privately and publicly produced goods and services. The utility function 
was assumed strongly separable so that the state's resources are first 
allocated among private and public provision of goods and services and 
then the public revenues are allocated among the 11 functional categories 
of public production. The outputs of public sector employees were not 
explicitly described. It was asserted that the per capita flow of 
services from each type of public agency is proportional to the per 
capita public employment within that agency. A system of demand 
functions for the 11 public employment categories was derived from this 
framework. Per capita employment in each category is a function of its 
own wage, the state's per capita total public employment budget, and 
sociodemographic variables presumed to affect the tastes of the decision 
maker. The wage levels were assumed exogenous. 
The data were state-level observations pooled over the period from 
1958 to 1969. The system of demand functions was estimated over the 
pooled data set using three-stage least squares. Initially, the state's 
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functional distribution of public employment funds was assumed to be 
determined each year independently of the previous year's decision (zero-
based budgeting for each public agency). Next, the system of equations 
was estimated assuming that each agency's funding is determined by 
increments to the previous year's budget. Ehrenberg found the partial 
own-wage elasticity of demand for public education employees to be 
negative and inelastic. This partial elasticity holds the state's total 
employment budget constant. Since Ehrenberg found that a wage increase 
in any or all public employment categories served to increase the state's 
total employment budget, this partial elasticity estimate is an upper 
bound in absolute terms on the total own-wage elasticity of demand 
(Ehrenberg, 1973, p. 376). 
All of the above mentioned studies estimated the demand for 
teachers. They differ with respect to the source and type of data used, 
the theoretical structure employed, and in some empirical results. What 
follows is a brief description of the similarities and differences among 
Che papers reviewed. 
All of the papers except Ehrenberg's used data describing school 
districts of a single state for a single academic year. Ehrenberg pooled 
cross-sectional observations at the state level over an 11-year period. 
Only Wentzler's (1981) study examined the demand for elementary and 
secondary teachers separately. Ehrenberg's (1973) measure of teachers 
combined teachers with administrators and all other personnel employed in 
the field of public education at the state and local level and used this 
figure on a per capita basis. The other studies used the teacher-student 
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ratio or its inverse, average class size. Two papers, those by Brown 
(1972) and Boardman et al. (1982), also estimated the demand for educa­
tion and experience levels of teachers but did not clearly state the 
construction of the dependent variables that they used. Finally, all 
studies used an average salary to measure the price of teacher services. 
Hall and Carroll (1973) and Wentzler (1981) calculated this average from 
the school district's salary schedule. The other studies used the 
average of actual salaries paid. 
There was also a degree of diversity in the theoretical approaches 
taken to describe the school district behavior. Generally, the welfare 
or utility of the population of the area served by the school district 
was maximized through the provision of education by the public schools 
and the provision of a composite measure of goods and services by other 
local government agencies. Teacher demand was derived through its 
contribution to the production of education, education being an argument 
in the utility or welfare function being maximized. Brown (1972), 
Boardman et al. (1982) (for one of the cases that they proposed), and 
Ehrenberg (1973) assumed the determination of the price of teacher 
services to be exogenous to the school district so that each school 
district faced an infinitely elastic supply of teacher services at the 
market determined price. Boardman et al. (1982) also considered a case 
where the school district was assumed to be a monopsonist in the market 
for teacher services. Papers by Hall and Carroll (1973) and Wentzler 
(1981) described the price of teacher services as being endogenous to the 
school district without mention of the nature of the market for teacher 
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services. Hall and Carroll (1973) considered class size, the inverse of 
the teacher-student ratio, to be determined by the school district and to 
be an indicator of the quality of the work environment of teachers. They 
expected that as class size increased, the school district would have to 
increase the salary it offered in order to attract teachers to work in 
the district. Wentzler (1981) included the number of teachers employed 
by the district as an argument in the function describing the supply 
price of teachers, implying that the school district possessed a degree 
of monopsony power. 
Three papers estimated the demand for teacher services assuming that 
the price of teacher services was exogenous to the school district. 
Brown (1972) found that the quantity of teachers demanded decreased as 
the average teacher salary increased for the statewide sample and three 
of the four subsamples. Ehrenberg (1973) estimated the own-wage 
elasticity of demand for state and local public education employees to be 
negative and inelastic. Boardman et al. (1982), however, found that 
average teacher salary had no statistically significant effect on the 
demand for teachers by school districts. The Brown (1972) and Boardman 
et al. (1982) papers also estimated the demand for teachers with higher 
education levels and the demand for teacher experience under the assump­
tion that the supply price of teachers was exogenous to the district. 
Boardman et al. (1982) found that both the demand for teachers of higher 
education levels and the demand for average teacher experience increased 
as the average teacher salary increased. Brown (1972) estimated that the 
demand for the percentage of teachers with a Master's degree increased as 
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average teacher salary increased for the statewide sample and two of the 
four subsamples. He also found that average teacher salary had a 
positive and statistically significant effect on the demand for average 
teacher experience for the statewide sample and three of the four 
subsamples. 
Wentzler (1981), Boardman et al. (1982), and Hall and Carroll (1973) 
estimated teacher demand and teacher supply price with two-stage least 
squares under the assumption that both are endogenous to the school 
district. Wentzler (1981) and Boardman et al. (1982) found that the 
teacher-student ratio had a statistically significant positive impact on 
teacher supply price which can be interpreted as evidence that school 
districts possess a degree of monopsony power in the market for teacher 
services. Hall and Carroll (1973) found that the price of teacher 
services decreased as the teacher-student ratio increased. This finding 
supports their contention that teacher compensation consists of both pay 
and work conditions and that as work conditions, measured by class size, 
improve, the school district can offer a lower wage. Boardman 
et al. (1982) estimated only a reduced-form equation for teacher demand 
under the monopsony hypothesis. Finally, Wentzler (1981) and Hall and 
Carroll (1973) found that the demand for teachers decreased as average 
salary increased within the two-stage least squares format. 
This study hopes to improve on those discussed above by taking 
advantage of a rich data set and through a more complete treatment of the 
supply side of the market. The data to be used describe 23 public school 
systems of the state of Maryland. Like Wentzler's (1981) paper, school. 
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teacher, and pupil characteristics are available at the elementary 
(kindergarten through the sixth grades) and the secondary (seventh 
through twelfth grades) levels. Separate examination of the markets for 
elementary and secondary teachers may be warranted in view of the 
different skills required for teaching at the two school levels 
(Wentzler, 1981, p. 446). Brown (1972) and Boardman et al. (1982) 
estimated the demand for teacher quality using measures of teachers' 
education and experience levels to capture teacher quality. The Maryland 
data allows for the contruction of a number of measures of teacher 
quality under the assumption that higher levels of educational 
preparation and greater years of teaching experience do make for a higher 
quality teacher. The demand for teachers with levels of educational 
preparation of less than a bachelor's degree, a bachelor's degree, and a 
master's degree or more are estimated on a per student basis. 
The demand for several measures of teacher experience are also 
estimated. These measures include average teacher experience, the number 
of less experienced teachers per student (those with four or less years 
of teaching experience at the end of the current school year), the number 
of more experienced teachers per student (those with five or more years 
of teaching experience at the end of the current school year), and total 
years of teaching experience per student. The four-year mark is used to 
separate teachers into the more and less experienced categories based 
upon data availability and a finding concerning teacher mobility by 
Murnane (1984, pp. 516-518). Murnane provides evidence from an urban 
school district that selective attrition occurs among teachers in their 
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first years of teaching experience. Teachers receive feedback concerning 
their productivity which,provides them with information concerning the 
quality of "job match" they have made. Individuals who find that their 
productivity in their current position is low leave teaching in that 
school district in order to find a better quality "job match." Murnane 
found evidence of selective attrition among teachers in their first years 
of teaching experience but found no evidence of such attrition taking 
place among teachers with four or more years of teaching experience. 
This result tends to support the belief that more experienced teachers 
are better quality teachers, all else equal. Total years of teacher 
experience per student provides a measure of the average quality of 
teacher each student interacts with. Also, the per student measurement 
is consistent with the measurement of other inputs in the educational 
production function. 
Both the salary schedule and the average of actual teacher salaries 
paid are available for each school district. Thus, it is possible to see 
how sensitive the regression results are to the wage specification 
chosen. Brown (1972) and Boardman et al. (1982), assuming the price of 
teacher services to be exogenous to the school district, found in a 
number of cases that the price of teacher services had an insignificant 
or even a positive significant effect on the demand for various measures 
of teacher services. A possible explanation of these findings is that 
the wage variable used in each case was not a good measure of the price 
the school district faced for teacher services. Also, the salary 
schedule enables the construction of prices of teacher services for 
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teachers of different quality levels (i.e., teachers with varying levels 
of educational preparation and teaching experience). Finally, like 
Ehrenberg's (1973), the Maryland data is cross-sectional and pooled over 
time. 
The demand for teacher services is derived within the context of a 
welfare maximization process as were the papers discussed above, with the 
exception of the study by Hall and Carroll (1973). Another route by 
which this study hopes to further knowledge of teacher demand is the 
consideration of three possible frameworks within which the stock of 
teachers may be determined by a school district. In the simplest case, 
the school district is assumed to face a perfectly elastic supply curve 
of teacher services at the market determined price. The advantage of 
such an approach is its simplicity. Boardman et al. (1982), Brown 
(1972), and Ehrenberg (1973) used this approach to estimate the demand 
for teachers. 
The second framework of analysis treats both the quantity of 
teachers demanded and the price of teacher services as being endogenous 
to the school district. As in the first situation, the school district 
purchases teacher services in a competitive market. Using the hedonic 
approach, teachers are assumed to respond to a wage/job characteristics 
package, requiring a higher wage to compensate for less desirable working 
conditions (Antos and Rosen, 1975, p. 126). 
Literature dealing with teacher bargaining suggests that class size, 
the inverse of the teacher-student ratio, is considered to be an 
important job characteristic by teachers (Perry, 1979, pp. 13-14). Since 
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Che number of students is assumed exogenous to the school district, and 
smaller class sizes are taken to be a positive amenity, the school 
district should find that as it employs more teachers, it is able to pay 
a lower wage (price of teacher services) as class sizes become smaller. 
As with the Hall and Carroll (1973), Wentzler (1981), and Boardman 
et al. (1982) studies, two-stage least squares is used to estimate both 
the price and quantity of teacher services. 
The third framework also treats the price and quantity of teacher 
services as endogenous. In this case, the endogeneity of the price of 
teacher services results from the school district possessing a degree of 
monopsony power in the market for teacher services. Landon and Baird 
(1971, pp. 68-70) have suggested that large school districts may possess 
some degree of monopsony power over teachers. Boardman et al. (1982) 
found that Pennsylvania school districts possessed a degree of monopsony 
power. A model similar to that used by Boardman et al. is used to test 
for monopsony power by Maryland school districts. 
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III. MODEL OF THE SCHOOL DISTRICT AS A PRICE TAKER 
A. Derivation of the Demand Function for Teacher Services 
This section models the demand for teacher services by a public 
school district under the assumption that the public school district is a 
price taker in the market for teacher services. The public school system 
is composed of elementary and secondary schools. The public school 
system superintendent is the decision maker who allocates the system's 
resources to educate its students. Hanushek (1979, p. 355) defines 
education as "a service that transforms fixed quantities of inputs (i.e., 
individuals) into individuals with different quality attributes." 
There exist several views as to what the nature of this transforma­
tion is. Hanushek (1979, 1981) and Cohn (1979) have surveyed a number of 
studies that focus on the human capital aspect of schooling. This 
approach views students as acquiring market skills through the schooling 
process in order to increase their future earnings. Bowles and Gintis 
(1975, p. 75) assert that while schooling may increase the individual's 
productivity, the true transformation that takes place within the public 
schools is the socialization of students. They view the schooling 
process as being a tool of the capitalist class with which to reproduce 
the social and economic order. Still a third view proposes that schools 
do not transform the individual at all. Wolpin (1977) and Spence (1973) 
have suggested that the function of schools may simply be to sort 
students. Students attend school in order to acquire a signal that 
indicates their future productivity to prospective future employers. 
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For the purposes of this dissertation, the public school system is 
assumed to produce educational services. This approach is similar to 
that taken by Hall and Carroll (1973), Wentzler (1981), Brown (1972), and 
Ehrenberg (1973). The superintendent is concerned with QC, the average 
level of educational services produced per student. Production of QC is 
described by an educational production function. Studies estimating 
educational production functions have used the following measures of 
school output: achievement test scores, student and parent attitudes, 
school retention rates, college freshman grades, the percentage of 
students completing high school, and the percentage of high school 
graduates that attend college (Cohn, 1979, pp. 168-191). The educational 
production function used here is assumed well-behaved and its arguments 
are the standard ones employed in the educational production function 
literature (Hanushek, 1981, Cohn, 1979, Summers and Wolfe, 1977, and 
Levin, 1976). It is of the form 
QC = Q(e^ , 0g, Qp, 6y). (3.1) 
0^ is a vector indicating the number of teachers of type i (i = 1, 
2, 3, ..., z), per student. Teachers can be classified by a number of 
different criteria including education levels, experience levels, and 
certification levels. It is expected that different types of teachers 
have varying effects on the production of educational services. Student 
contact with or access to teachers of type i is described by the ratio of 
type i teachers to the student body Also, the overall teacher-
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student ratio is the inverse of the average class size in the district. 
It is generally assumed that smaller class sizes allow teachers to devote 
more attention to the needs of individual students, thus increasing the 
quantity of educational services produced. 
8g is a vector of nonteacher school district characteristics 
describing the physical learning environment facing the district's 
students. Measures describing school characteristics in the literature 
include the number of library books per pupil (Summers and Wolfe, 1977, 
p. 645), measures of the quantity and quality of equipment such as 
audiovisual aids (Cohn, 1979, p. 165), and the age and the nature of 
school buildings (Levin, 1976, p. 152). 
Here, ©g is interpreted as a vector of relevant nonteacher school 
characteristics, each expressed on a per student basis. Of the school 
district characteristics included in the vector ©g, some are subject to 
the control of the superintendent, while others are not. Let the vector 
0g be broken down into two vectors, ©g^ and ©g^. ©g^ consists of those 
characteristics that are subject to the superintendent's discretion, such 
as the number of nonteacher educational personnel and the quantity and 
quality of textbooks and audiovisual aids, ©g^ is made up of the 
remaining school district characteristics, those not controllable by the 
superintendent. Purchases of (or investments in) buildings may be 
financed through borrowing and are often subject to separate state 
legislation and thus would be included in ©g^ (Boardman et al., 1982, 
p. 135). 
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©p is a vector of relevant pupil characteristics. It enters as an 
argument of the educational production function as the ability and prior 
learning experiences of a student are likely to affect the quality and 
quantity of learning that takes place. Prior studies have used measures 
such as the mean level and standard deviation in the socioeconomic status 
of students, the percent white students in the district (Brown and Saks, 
1975, pp. 586-592), and the student's sex, IQ, and attendance records 
(Summers and Wolfe, 1977, p. 642) to capture the effect of student 
characteristics on the production of education. 
Finally, home environment and community characteristics are expected 
to affect the level of educational services produced. These character­
istics, represented by the vector ©g, attempt to capture the degree to 
which education is nurtured, encouraged, and rewarded within the home and 
within the community. Measures previously used to capture these effects 
include the degree of urbanization and poverty within the district, the 
educational attainment of the parents and the community as a whole, and 
the income, race, and size of the family (Cohn, 1979, pp. 166-167). 
Thus, not all of the arguments of the educational production func­
tion are subject to the superintendent's control. ®gjj> ®p5 and Q^, as 
well as the number of students, S, are taken to be exogenous to the 
school district. 0^, the vector of teachers of each type, and ®g^» the 
vector describing those nonteacher school district characteristics which 
are discretionary, are endogenous to the school district. 
As the superintendent must operate within a budget, the determina­
tion of which is described below, his decisions concerning the levels of 
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utilization of each of the educational inputs to use are conditioned not 
only on the productivities of each at the margin, but also on their 
prices. Here, the school district is assumed to be a price taker in all 
of its input markets. 
Teacher salaries are commonly determined according to a salary 
schedule which rewards educational preparation and teaching experience. 
Thus, p^, the price of a teacher of type i (i= 1, 2, 3, —, Z), can be 
represented as 
pu = pî + p*. (3.2) 
Type i teachers possess a level of educational preparation for which 
they are paid, pî, and a level of experience for which they are paid, p*. 
There is a base level of pay for the minimum level of educational 
preparation, say the bachelor's degree. Teachers with higher levels of 
educational preparation, say a master's degree or a Ph.D., receive 
progressively higher levels of pay for their level of educational 
preparation. Similarly, while new, inexperienced teachers receive no pay 
component for experience (p* = 0); teachers receive progressively higher 
pay levels for experience as they acquire more years of teaching exper­
ience. Thus, the total current expenses that arise from hiring teachers, 
E^, can be represented as 
z 
E™ = I (p; * T.). (3.3) 
i=l 
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Let 0g^ consist of W discretionary nonteacher school district 
characteristics. The price of each of these inputs, (m = 1, 2, 3, 
W), is exogenous to the school district and is equal to p^, m = (1, 
W). Total current expenses arising from the purchases of nonteacher 
discretionary inputs, E^, are represented as 
S = ^ PM * (3 4) 
m—1 
The current educational expenses of the school district, E^, are 
represented as 
Sc = E, + E^. (3.5) 
As described above, the school system produces a service which is 
provided to residents of the school district by the local government. 
The local government provides other goods and services, such as police 
and fire protection and recreational facilities, to residents. Previous 
studies of teacher demand (Boardman et al., 1982, Brown, 1972, and 
Wentzler, 1981), along with several recent papers which have applied the 
median-voter hypothesis to the analysis of the provision of goods and 
services by local governments (Megdal, 1984, Munley, 1984, Romer and 
Rosenthal, 1982, and Gramlich and Rubinfeld, 1982), suggest that local 
government officials act so as to maximize the welfare of the residents 
of the school district or maximize the utility of the median voter in 
order to maintain their elected positions. Following is a brief 
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description of the framework within which the superintendent of the 
school district operates. 
Local government officials tax and spend in such a way as to 
maximize the welfare of the residents of the school district, represented 
by a welfare function of the form 
V = V(QC, L, C). (3.6) 
QC has been described above. L is a composite measure of all other 
goods and services provided by the local government, C is the level of 
goods and services privately purchased and consumed by the district's 
residents. Income levels of residents, state and federal taxes, and 
state and federal aid levels are assumed exogenous to local officials. 
Local revenues are raised through a property tax on assessed wealth in 
the district. Through determination of the local property tax rate, 
local officials determine the ability of residents to privately purchase 
and consume goods and services. These officials then allocate the local 
budget, consisting of state and federal aid and local property tax 
revenues, among the provision of educational services and the composite 
measure of other goods and services, L. Suppose the price of QC is P^, 
and the price indices for purchases of L and C are and P^, respec­
tively. Local government officials choose the property tax rate and the 
levels of QC and L to be provided so that the local budget is exhausted 
and the following condition is satisfied: 
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3V/3QC _ 3V/3L _ 3V/3C 
The result of the above process is that the school system superin­
tendent will be given a budget for current educational expenditures, 
His charge is to maximize the quantity of educational services produced 
per student given his budget, the prices of educational inputs, and the 
educational production function. In terms of the model described above, 
this involves the maximization of (3.1) subject to equations (3.3), 
(3.4), and (3.5). This yields demand functions for teacher services and 
discretionary school inputs of the form 
X = fd[P^, ..., P^, pf, ..., P^, BE/S, OGJJ, 0P, 0JJ] (3.8) 
for X = (Tj/S, ..., T^/S, Dj/S, ..., \/S). 
The per student demand for each educational input is a function of 
all variable educational input prices, the total current educational 
funds per students, and the vectors of home and community character­
istics, 0 , pupil characteristics, 0 , and nondiscretionary school 
characteristics, The quantity of type i teachers demanded (on a per 
student basis) is expected to decrease as their price, p^, increases. In 
response to an increase in p^, there will be a substitution away from 
T./S towards the other discretionary educational inputs. The scale 
effect should reinforce this movement as the quantity of T^/S demanded 
decreases further as the quantity of educational services produced drops. 
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Similar results are expected for nonteacher discretionary educational 
inputs as for the teacher inputs described above. 
The direction of the change in quantity demanded of any discretion­
ary educational input in response to a change in the price of another 
educational input depends on the production technology and the size of 
the scale effect. If two inputs are gross complements, the quantity 
demanded of one will decrease in response to an increase in the price of 
the other. If they are gross substitutes, the quantity demanded of one 
will increase in response to an increase in the price of the second. If 
the per student educational budget increases, there will be a pure scale 
effect, increasing the quantity demanded of normal inputs and decreasing 
the quantity demanded of inferior inputs. Finally, the nondiscretionary 
educational inputs are included to control for their effects on the 
marginal productivities of the discretionary inputs. 
B. Model Estimation 
1. Introduction 
This section estimates the demand for teacher services by school 
district under the assumption that the school district is a price taker 
in the market for teacher services. First, the combined demand for 
elementary and secondary teachers is examined, and then the demand for 
these two groups is estimated separately. This allows for comparison of 
results with the previous studies and will indicate whether the market 
for teacher services differs at the two schooling levels. Next, the 
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demand for teacher quality is estimated—first the demand for the three 
levels of educational preparation, and then the demand for the various 
experience measures. The demand for teacher quality by school districts 
and then by elementary and secondary systems separately are estimated. 
The demand functions are of the same form as equation (3.8). All 
dependent variables are in per student terms, except for average teacher 
experience. Three alternative specifications of the price of teacher 
services, TPRICE, are used. The first form, AVSALSD, AVSALEL, and 
AVSALHS, is the average of actual salaries paid by the school district as 
a whole, by the elementary system, and by the secondary system, 
respectively. The second, BSAL, is the base salary for new teachers with 
a bachelor's degree. The third, MIDSAL, is the midpoint of the salary 
schedule for teachers with a bachelor's degree. Both the first and third 
wage specifications were used in studies reviewed in Chapter II. Use of 
the three should indicate which best captures the price of teacher 
services. All three specifications are in 1972 dollars. 
Two budget measures are used. Both are in 1972 dollars and are in 
per pupil terms. The school district is modelled as operating under a 
single budget constraint. However, for estimation purposes the budget 
for current educational expenditures is broken down into local funds, 
LOCFUND, and combined state and federal funds, OSFUND, as the state and 
federal funds may have restrictions put on their use by the granting 
agencies and, therefore, may have differing effects on the demand for 
teacher services. 
31 
PNW, the percent of the school district's population that is 
nonwhite, is included to capture both the home and community character­
istics, as well as the student's ability and previous educational 
experiences. The attendance measures for the school district, the 
elementary system, and the secondary system—PCÂ, PCAE, and PCAH—are 
included to capture the home environment of the students. It is assumed 
that parents that are supportive of their children's educational pursuits 
will take steps to ensure that their children are attending regularly. 
VPROPSD, VPROPEL, and VPROPHS are the value of school property and 
equipment per pupil within the school district, the elementary system, 
and the secondary system, respectively. They are expressed in 1972 
dollars. These measures are included to control for the effect that the 
quality of educational facility has on the production of education and, 
thus, on the demand for teacher services. 
Finally, TREND is the time trend variable. It is included in order 
to pick up the effect that unmeasured characteristics that change over 
the period have on the demand for teachers. 
2. Data description 
The data have been collected from three sources: the State of 
Maryland Annual Report for the years ending June 30, 1956 through 
June 30, 1980, The Salary Schedules of Professional Personnel, Maryland 
Public Schools for the 1957-1958 through 1979-1980 school years, and the 
County and City Data Book, 1952, 1956, 1962, 1967, 1972, and 1983 
editions. Data pertaining to the 1957-1958 school year will hereafter be 
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referred to as 1958 data; data from the 1958-1959 school year will be 
referred to as 1959 data, and so on. 
Table 1 lists and briefly describes the dependent and independent 
variables used in the regressions discussed in the next section. All of 
the dependent variables, except those measuring average years of 
experience per teacher, are in per student terms in order to be 
consistent with the model. Professional personnel are members of the 
professional staff who are considered to be engaged in instructional 
activity by the Department of Education. They consist of principals, 
vice-principals, teachers, librarians, guidance counselors, audio-visual 
personnel, and psychological personnel. Data on educational preparation 
and experience levels pertain to these professional personnel. Finally, 
the implicit price deflator for gross national product relevent to state 
and local government purchases of goods and services has been used to 
convert all monetary variables in 1972 dollars. 
Each of the dependent variables is in groups of three because each 
variable has been collected for the school district as a whole, the 
elementary system, and the secondary system. The first category of 
dependent variables measures the teacher-student ratio. The next breaks 
down teachers into three levels of educational preparation. The third 
category contains four measures of teacher experience. These last two 
categories make it possible to estimate the demand for teacher quality by 
school districts, quality being measured by the experience and education 
levels of the teachers. 
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Table 1. Descriptive variable list 
Dependent variables 
Teacher-student ratio 
PTS, PTES, PTHS—the per student number of professional personnel within 
the school district, the elementary school system, and 
the secondary school system, respectively 
Levels of educational preparation 
LDS, LDES, HDES—the per student number of professional personnel whose 
education level is less than a bachelor's degree for the 
school district, the elementary system, and the 
secondary system, respectively 
BDS, BDES, BDHS—the per student number of professional personnel whose 
highest relevant educational degree is a bachelor's 
degree for the school district, the elementary system, 
and the secondary system, respectively 
HDS, HDES, HDHS—the per student number of professional personnel who 
possesses a master's degree or a higher degree for the 
school district, the elementary system, and the 
secondary system, respectively 
Experience measures 
EXPSD, EXPSEL, EXPSHS—the per student total years of teaching experience 
within the school district, the elementary system, 
and the secondary system, respectively 
LXSD, LXES, LXHS—the per student number of teachers with four or less 
years of teaching experience within the school 
district, the elementary system, and the secondary 
system, respectively 
MXSD, MXES, MXHS—the per student number of teachers with more than four 
years of teaching experience within the school 
district, the elementary system, and the secondary 
system, respectively 
ATEXSD, ATEXEL, ATEXHS—average years of experience per teacher within 
the school district, the elementary system, and 
the secondary system, respectively 
Table 1. continued 
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Independent variables 
Prices of teacher services 
AVSALSD, ÂVSÂLEL, AVSALHS—the average of actual salaries paid to 
professional personnel within the school 
district, the elementary system, and the 
secondary system, respectively, in 1972 
dollars 
BSAL—the base salary for a teacher with no prior experience possessing a 
bachelor's degree, 1972 dollars 
MIDSAL—the average salary for teachers with a bachelor's degree in 1972 
dollars, derived from the salary schedule 
INCED—the average increment to the base salary for a teacher possessing 
a master's degree, 1972 dollars 
Budget variables 
LOCFUND—local funds for current educational expenditures per pupil, 1972 
dollars 
OSFUND—state and federal funds for current educational expenditures per 
pupil, 1972 dollars 
TOTFUND—total funds (local, state, and federal combined) for current 
educational expenditures per pupil, 1972 dollars 
Home, pupil, and school district characteristics 
PNW—percent of the population within the school district that is 
nonwhite 
PCA, PCAE, PCAH—the average percentage of students attending for the 
school district, at the elementary level, and at the 
secondary level, respectively 
VPROPSD, VPROPEL, VPROPHS—the value of school property and equipment per 
student within the school district, the 
elementary system, and the secondary systems, 
respectively, in 1972 dollars 
TREND—the time trend variable, defined such that Q=1 if the observation 
pertains to the 1957-1958 school year, Q=2 if the observation 
pertains to the 1958-1959 school year, and so on 
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The first category of independent variables contains a number of 
variables that capture the price of teacher services. The first group 
represents the average of actual salaries paid while BSÂL, MIDSÂL, INCEX, 
and INCED are constructed from the salary schedules of the school 
districts. This makes it possible to determine which of the price 
variables best captures the price of teacher services faced by the school 
district. It also allows for more accuracy in the pricing of the 
services of teachers of different education or experience levels. The 
next category of explanatory variables describes the budget variables. 
The final group of variables represents the home, pupil, and school 
district characteristics that enter the educational production function. 
3. Estimation techniques 
Following the derivation of teacher demand in Section A of this 
chapter under the assumption that the price of teacher services is 
exogenous to the school district, this section describes the estimation 
of teacher demand by the school district. The demand function to be 
estimated is of the form: 
PTS. = fdPRICE., LOCFUHD., 0SFUND., PNW., PCA., VPROPSD., 
J J J J J J J 
TREND.) + U.. (3.9) 
J J 
j = (1, 2, 3, —, n) where n = number of observations. 
The dependent variable, PTS, is the number of professional personnel 
per pupil, hereafter teachers, demanded by the school district. Three 
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specifications of TPRICE, the price of teacher services, will be tested— 
AVSALSD, BSÂL, and MIDSÂL. As long as teachers are a normal input of the 
educational production function, the price of teacher services is 
expected to have a negative effect on the demand for teacher services. 
Increases in the per pupil educational budget through an increase in 
LOCFOND and/or OSFUND are expected to increase the demand for teacher 
services. 
PNW, PCA, and VPROPSD are included to control for arguments of the 
educational production function which are not subject to the discretion 
of the school district superintendent. PCA, the average percentage of 
pupils attending, and PNW, the percentage of the population served by the 
school district that is nonwhite, attempt to capture the effects of 
relevant pupil, home environment, and community characteristics. The 
model developed in Section A of this chapter assumed that capital invest­
ment decisions are outside the superintendent's control. Thus, VPROPSD 
represents the effect of nondiscretionary school district characteristics 
upon educational production. Finally, TREND, the time trend variable, is 
included to capture the effect of any unmeasured determinants of teacher 
demand that change over time. 
Equation (3.9) was initially estimated over the 23 counties for the 
1958 through 1980 school years using ordinary least-squares techniques. 
It was assumed that the error term, (for j = 1, 2, 3, ..., n), where n 
is the number of observations, had an expected value of zero, a constant 
variance, and was pairwise independent (i.e., E(W^ * = 0 for 
s ^  0). Examination of the Durbin-Watson statistic indicated that the 
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assumption that the error terms were pairwise independent was violated. 
Durbin's two-step correction procedure is used to transform the data to 
correct for autocorrelation (Johnston, 1972, pp. 263-265). 
Following is a description of the correction procedure used in the 
estimation of equation (3.9). The data used in the estimation of all 
models in this chapter were also transformed using this procedure. The 
presence of autocorrelation is not unexpected given the time-series 
component of the data. It implies that the error term for the 
observation of county "A" in year t is functionally related to the error 
term for the observation of county "A" in year t-1. Let the error term 
of equation (3.9) exhibit a positive first-order autoregressive process 
described as follows: 
U. = P * U. , + E. (3.10) 
J J-1 J 
where 0 < P < 1 satisfies the assumptions. 
s=0; 
s*0. (3.11) 
Durbin's two-stage procedure is used to estimate P, then to 
transform the original data with that statistic, P, and, finally, through 
the application of ordinary least squares to the transformed data, derive 
E(Ej) = 0; 
- "• 
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Che escimaced generalized leasc-squares esCimaCors of the unknown 
coefficients of equacion (3.9) (Judge et al., 1982, pp. 462-465). 
Estimation of the following equation. 
PTS. = + PPTS. , + Y,TPRICE. + Y^TPRICE. , + T-LOCFDND. 
J 0 J-1 1 J 2 J-1 3 J 
+ Y.LOCFUND. , + Y.OSFUND. + Y,OSFUND. , + Y,PNW. 
4 J-1 5 J 6 J-1 7 J 
+ YgPNW. , + YqPCA. + Y.-PCA. . +Y,,VPROPSD. 8 J-1 9 J 10 J-1 11 J 
by ordinary least squares yields consistent estimators of the parameters 
(Johnston, 1972, p. 263). 
One modification of the above procedure had to be made due to the 
nature of the data set (i.e., cross-sectional data pooled over time). 
Before estimation of equation (3.12), the 1958 observation for each of 
the 23 counties was dropped. Failure Co do so would have implied that 
the disturbance term for the observation of county "B" in year 1958 is 
functionally related to the disturbance term for the observation of 
county "A" in year 1980 which is clearly not justified. 
Using P from the estimation of equation (3.12), the original 
observations were transformed as follows: 
+ Y^gVPROPSD. j-1 + Y^gTRENDj + Gj, j = (2 • • • J n), (3.12) 
X. = X. - (p * X. ,), for all variables. 
J J J-1 
(3.13) 
Again, and for the same justification as above, the 1958 observation 
for each county was dropped. The next sections discuss Che regression 
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results from the estimation of the demand functions for teachers using 
the data transformation described above to correct for positive first-
order autocorrelation. 
4. Estimation of the demand for teachers 
This section describes the estimation of equation (3.9) using the 
transformed data. The expected coefficient signs, assuming that teachers 
are a normal input in the production of education, were justified in 
Section C(l) of this chapter and are as follows: 
(-) (+) (+) (?) (?) (?) (?) 
PTS = f(TPRICE, LOCFUND, OSFUND, PNW, PCA, VPROPSD, TREND). (3.14) 
Table 2 describes the results from the estimation of equation (3.14) 
using three specifications of TPRICE, the price of teacher services. F-
tests for each regression indicate that the hypothesis that there is no 
linear relationship among PTS and the independent variables can be 
rejected in all three cases. Between 37 and 39 percent of the variation 
in the demand for teachers is explained by each of the three regressions. 
Durbin-Watson tables were available up to only n=200 observations. Use 
of this table indicated that the hypothesis of no autocorrelation among 
the error terms using the transformed data can be accepted at the five 
percent significance level. 
AVSALSD, the average of actual teacher salaries paid, was the only 
specification of the price of teacher services that was significant and 
showed the expected sign. According to the parameter estimate, an 
40 













Dependent variable PTS 































































®t-statistics in parentheses (2-tailed test) 
*Significant at five percent. 
**Significant at ten percent. 
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increase in average teacher salaries of 1,000 1972 dollars would result 
in a decrease of one teacher demanded for every 1,000 students. 
Neither of the budget measures, local or state and local educational 
funds per pupil, were significant in any of the regressions. To test 
whether this lack of significance resulted from improperly disaggregating 
the budget into two measures, the same regressions were run combining all 
current educational funds per student into one measure, TOTFUND. 
However, the estimated coefficients of TOTFUND were found to be 
insignificant in all three cases. 
For a one percentage point increase in PNW, the percent of the 
population served by the school district that is nonwhite, the school 
district demands approximately one more teacher for every 1,500 students 
according to the two regressions where PNW came in significantly. A one 
percentage point increase in PCA, the average percent of pupils 
attending, increases the demand for teachers by the school district by 
between one teacher for every 3,700 students and one teacher for every 
4,750 students. According to the two regressions in which VPROPSD came 
in significantly, a school district with an additional $100 in plant and 
equipment per pupil will employ one additional teacher per 20,000 
students. Finally, determinants of teacher demand that change over time 
and are not captured by the variables discussed above caused an increase 
in one teacher per 1,000 students each year. 
Thus, AVSALSD did a better job of capturing the true price of 
teacher services faced by the school district than did the other measures 
which were constructed by the salary schedule of the school district. 
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Although the estimated coefficient of LOCFUND, local educational funds 
per pupil, was positive and had a t-statistic greater than one in all 
three cases, it was not significant at the ten percent level in any of 
the three regressions. The coefficient estimate for OSFUND, state and 
federal funds per pupil, was also insignificant in each case and actually 
came in with a negative sign which was not as expected. PCA and VPROPSD 
generally came in positive and significant which can be taken to imply 
that a home environment supportive of education and a higher quality 
physical learning environment both increase the productivity of teachers 
at the margin, causing more to be hired. As PNW was included to control 
for home, community, and pupil characteristics, it is difficult to 
pinpoint the cause of its positive effect on the demand for teachers. 
Finally, the strongly significant effect of the time trend variable 
indicates that factors not measured by this model but that change over 
time have a positive effect on the demand for teachers for the period 
studied. 
Past studies of school districts have employed locational dummy 
variables (Wentzler, 1981, pp. 438-445) or have broken the data set down 
into groups based upon population size (Landon and Baird, 1971, p. 968) 
or community types (Brown, 1972, pp. 203-218) in order to control for the 
effects of community tastes and attitudes towards education and district 
size on the demand for teachers. la order to see whether school district 
size affects the responsiveness of teacher demand to the price of teacher 
services, the data set was broken down into three groups—small, medium-
sized, and large school districts. The criteria chosen were as follows. 
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The four "large" school districts had a 1958 population greater than 
100,000 and had over 20,000 pupils belonging to the public school system. 
The ten "medium-sized" school districts had a 1958 population of between 
29,500 and 100,000 and had between 6,000 and 20,000 pupils. "Small" 
districts had a 1958 population less than 29,500 and had less than 6,000 
pupils in the public school system. All of the school districts 
exhibited varying degrees of growth over the next 22 years, however it 
was such that the school districts remained in their respective 
categories. In 1980, the "large" school districts had a population of 
over 120,000 and over 25,000 students enrolled, "medium-sized" districts 
had a population of between 35,000 and 120,000 and between 8,000 and 
25,000 students, and, finally, the "small" school districts had a popula­
tion less than 35,000 and less than 8,000 students. 
Equation (3.14) was estimated using the three subsets of the data 
described above. The data were transformed by the procedure detailed in 
Section C(l) of this chapter to correct for positive first-order auto­
correlation of the error terms. Regression results are shown in 
Tables 3, 4, and 5 of the small, medium, and large school districts, 
respectively. For each, separate regressions were run for the three 
specifications of TPRICE, the price of teacher services. 
F-tests indicate that the hypothesis of no linear relationship 
between teachers and the independent variables can be rejected in all 
nine cases. The data transformation was successful in removing the 
positive first-order autorcorrelation. The percentage of the variation 
in the demand for teachers explained by the independent variables ranges 
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®t-statistics in parentheses (2-tailed test) 
*Significant at five percent. 
**Significant at ten percent. 
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AVSALSD -3.68408 E-7 
(-1.0476) 
BSÂL 9.37476 E-8 
(.2031) 
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*t-statistics in parentheses. 
•Significant at five percent. 
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from 60 percent for the medium-sized school districts to over 90 percent 
for the large school district sample. This compares with R-squared 
values of between 37 and 39 for the combined 23 school district sample. 
The Chow test was used to determine whether the disaggregation of 
the data set into the three groups was justified on the basis that the 
three samples were actually drawn from three separate populations 
(Intriligator, 1978, pp. 123-125). The test statistic, 
[SSE23 - (SSEg + SSE^ + SSE^)]/k 
^c " (SSEg + SSEjj + SSEj^)/(n^ + n^ + n^ - 3k)' (3.15) 
is distributed as F(2*k, n^ + n^ + n^ - 3*k) where n^, n^, and n^ are the 
sample sizes of the three groups of school districts, k is the number of 
independent explanatory variables including the intercept, and SSE^^» 
SSEg, SSEjj, and SSE^ are the error sums of squares for the 23—the small, 
the medium, and the large school district samples, respectively. 
values of 4.8, 4.4, and 4.9 were obtained for the three specifications of 
the price of teacher services, AVSALSD, BSAL, and MIDSAL, respectively. 
Thus, the hypothesis that the three subsamples are drawn from the same 
population, implying that parameters are the same over the three 
subsamples, is rejected at the one percent significance level for each of 
the three wage specifications. This result suggests that factors related 
to the size of the school district do affect the determination of teacher 
demand by school districts. 
Use of AVSALSD to capture the price of teacher services yielded the 
expected negative effect on the quantity of teacher services demanded. 
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but this effect was significant for only the small and medium-sized 
school districts. Actually, none of the three wage specifications had a 
significant effect on the demand for teacher services by large school 
districts. For the small school districts, the two "average" specifica­
tions, AVSALSD and MIDSÂL, had the expected negative and significant 
effect. For the medium-sized school districts, only AVSALSD, the average 
of actual salaries paid, showed the expected negative effect and came in 
significantly. 
The three regressions using data from the medium-sized school 
districts yielded poor results. The time trend variable was the only 
variable that was significant across all three regressions. 
LOCFUND, local educational funds per pupil, had the expected 
positive sign and came in significantly in all cases for the small and 
the large school district samples. For these two samples, the parameter 
estimates were of comparable magnitudes. OSFUND, state and federal 
educational funds, had a significant positive effect on the demand for 
teachers among the large school districts only. 
PNW, the percentage of the population that is nonwhite, had a 
significant negative effect on the quantity of teachers demanded in large 
school districts but mixed effects, none significant, in the small and 
medium-sized school districts. PCA, the attendance measure, had a 
positive effect on the demand for teachers in the small and large school 
district samples, this effect being significant in two of three large 
sample regressions and in all three of the small school district regres­
sions. The size of the effect is slightly larger within the large school 
districts. 
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The value of school property and equipment per student had a 
positive effect on the demand for teachers in all of the regressions 
using the small and large school district samples. This effect was 
significant in all three of the regressions using the large school 
district data and was significant or approached significance in the three 
regressions using the small district data. Its impact on the demand for 
teachers is roughly twice as large among large school districts as among 
the small. Finally, the time trend variable had a positive significant 
effect across all nine regressions, the size of the effect among the 
large districts being about 60 percent of that within the small and 
medium-sized districts. 
5. Estimation of the demand for elementary and secondary teachers 
This section describes the estimation of equation (3.9), now using 
PTES and PTHS, the teacher-student ratios at the elementary and secondary 
levels, respectively, as the dependent variables. This breakdown is made 
to examine the possibility that the markets for teacher services differ 
at the two schooling levels as was suggested by Wentzler (1981, p. 437). 
Wentzler considered this to be a possibility because of the different 
skill requirements and work conditions at each level. The expected signs 
of the parameter estimates are the same as in the estimation of the 
demand for teachers by the whole school district. 
Durbin's two-step procedure is again used to correct for positive 
first-order autocorrelation among the error terms. Several changes in 
the estimation procedure should be noted. First, ÂVSALEL, the average of 
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actual salaries paid to teachers within the elementary system, is used in 
the estimation of the demand for elementary teachers, while AVSÂLHS, a 
similar measure for secondary teachers, is used in the estimation of the 
demand for secondary teachers. PCAE, the average percent of elementary 
pupils attending, is used to capture the effect of the home environment 
in the production of education by the school district. The average 
attendance measure for secondary students is not used in the estimation 
of PTES as the attendance record of older pupils is more likely to be a 
choice variable of those students reflecting the perceived quality of the 
secondary school system. Finally, VPROPEL and VPROPHS, the value of 
school property and equipment per elementary and per secondary student, 
respectively, are used in place of VPROPSD. 
The results of the estimation of equation (3.14) using the full 23 
school district sample are presented in Tables 6 and 7. Here, due to 
data availability, the data describe the school systems for the 1958 
through 1977 school years. The R-squared values for the estimation of 
teacher demand at the elementary level are about 70 percent of those from 
the estimation of teacher demand by the whole school district, while the 
R-squared values using the secondary level data range from 41 to 54 
percent of the R-squared values using the data from the whole school 
district. F-statistics for the model indicate that the hypothesis of no 
linear relationship between PTES and PTHS and the independent variables 
can be rejected at the one percent significance level as had been the 
case with PTS. The data transformation removed the positive autocorrela­
tion among the error terms. 
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Dependent variable PTES 







ÂVSALEL -9.25455 E-7 
(-4.0542)* 
BSÂL 3.05154 E-7 
( .6121)  
MIDSAL 1.24772 E-7 
(.3546) 

















































®t-statistics in parentheses. 
*Significant at five percent. 
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Dependent variable PTES 
























































^t-statistics in parentheses. 
*Significant at five percent. 
**Significant at ten percent. 
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Again, as with the estimation of the demand for teachers by the 
school district, the average of actual salaries paid, here AVSALEL and 
AVSALHS, is the only specification of the price of teacher services that 
has a significant negative effect on the demand for teacher services. 
This effect is slightly larger at the secondary level than at the 
elementary level. The parameter estimates for the specifications of 
TPRICE constructed from the salary schedules, BSAL and MIDSAL, had 
positive signs but were nonsignificant in all cases. LOCFUND, local 
funds per pupil for current educational expense, had a positive but 
nonsignificant effect on the demand for teacher services in all of the 
regressions. OSFUND, combined state and federal funds per pupil for 
current educational expense, had a positive but insignificant effect on 
the demand for elementary teachers for all three specifications of the 
price of teacher services and a significant negative effect on the demand 
for secondary teachers for the three cases. 
It was initially hypothesized that both budget measures would have a 
positive effect on the demand for teacher services. In order to examine 
the possibility that the insignificance of both measures in explaining 
the demand for elementary teachers was due to improperly breaking down 
the budget constraint into the two measures, another set of regressions 
for estimating the demand for elementary teachers was run. The same 
procedures were followed to correct for autocorrelation, but LOCFUND and 
OSFUND were combined in constructing TOTFUND, total educational funds per 
pupil for current expenditures. Results of these regressions are shown 
in Table 8. 
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Dependent variable PTES 
































































®t-statistics in parentheses, 
•significant at five percent. 
**Significant at ten percent. 
55 
The R-squared values for the regressions shown in Table 8 were 
lower, but only by about two percentage points for each regression. The 
F-statistics of the models increased in each case. Parameter estimates 
for the nonbudget variables were virtually unchanged and TOTFUND had the 
expected positive effect on the demand for elementary teachers for the 
three specifications of TPRICE. This suggests that it is best to use a 
single budget measure to explain the demand for teacher services at the 
elementary level. 
Returning to the remainder of the parameter estimates in Table 6 
(which follow the same pattern of significance and signs as those from 
Table 8), the percentage of the population that is nonwhite has a 
consistently negative but nonsignificant effect on the demand for 
elementary teachers. The parameter estimates for the value of school 
property and equipment per elementary student are consistently positive 
and significant at the five percent level. PCAE, the attendance measure, 
has a positive effect on the demand for elementary teachers for all three 
specifications of the price of teacher services and approaches 
significance at the ten percent level for all three cases. Finally, the 
time trend variable has positive effect on the demand for elementary 
teachers, significant at the five percent level for all three cases. 
Turning to the regression results for estimating the demand for 
secondary teachers in Table 7, only one of the specifications of TPRICE, 
AVSALHS, has a negative effect on the demand for secondary teachers. It 
is significant at the five percent level. Local educational funds per 
pupil has a positive but nonsignificant effect on the demand for 
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secondary teachers while the parameter estimates of OSFUDD are negative 
and significant at the five percent level in each case. One possible 
explanation for the negative effect of state and federal educational 
funds per pupil on the demand for secondary teachers is that the 
direction of causality between the two variables may flow in both 
directions. It was hypothesized that a larger budget would cause school 
districts to hire more teachers. If federal and state educational 
dollars are targeted towards disadvantaged school districts and these 
disadvantaged districts exhibit low teacher-student ratios, then this 
could account for such a finding. Unlike the coefficient estimates for 
the budget variables in the estimation of the demand for elementary 
teachers, the estimated coefficients of the budget measures used to 
estimate the demand for secondary teachers were of opposite signs. 
Estimation of the demand for secondary teachers using the single budget 
measure TOTFUND had little effect on the parameter estimates for the 
nonbudget variables, the R-squared values, or the F-statistics of the 
model. The parameter estimates of TOTFUND were significant and negative 
in each case, indicating that the weak positive effect of LOCFUND was 
overwhelmed by the negative effect of OSFUND. 
The percentage of the population that is nonwhite had a consistently 
negative and nonsignificant effect on the demand for elementary teachers. 
This contrasted with the parameter estimates of PNW in the secondary 
regressions which were positive and significant for all three specifica­
tions of the price of teacher services. Estimated coefficients of the 
value of school property and equipment per pupil at the secondary level 
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were positive and significant at the five percent level and were a little 
more than half the size of those for the elementary system. Finally, the 
time trend variable had a consistently positive and significant effect on 
the demand for secondary teachers with estimated coefficients similar in 
size to those in the elementary regressions. 
The data set was again broken down into small, medium, and large 
school districts to examine the possibility that factors related to 
school district size might affect the school district's responsiveness to 
the price of teacher services. The demand for teacher services by the 
elementary and the secondary school systems was estimated for each of the 
subsamples are for each of the three specifications of the price of 
teacher services. A single budget measure, TOTFUND, was used for the 
elementary level regressions while the two budget measures, LOCFUND and 
OSFUND, were used at the secondary level. The data in each case were 
transformed to correct for positive first-order autocorrelation among the 
error terms. The regression results are shown in Tables 9 through 14. 
Chow tests indicate that the hypothesis that the three subsamples are 
from the same population can be rejected at the elementary and secondary 
levels at the one percent significance level. F-tests of the models 
indicate that the hypothesis of no linear relationship between the 
dependent and the independent variables can be rejected at the one 
percent significance level in each case. 
Of the specifications of the price of teacher services, AVSALEL and 
AVSALHS, the averages of actual salaries paid at the elementary and 
secondary levels, respectively, again perform best. Their estimated 
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Table 9. Estimation of the demand for elementary teachers by small 








































































^t-statistics in parentheses. 
*Significant at five percent. 
**Significant at ten percent. 
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Table 10. Estimation of the demand for elementary teachers by medium-
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^t-statistics in parentheses. 
*Significant at five percent. 
**Significant at ten percent. 
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Table 11. Estimation of the demand for elementary teachers by large 































































^t-statistics in parentheses. 
*Significant at five percent. 
**Significant at ten percent. 
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Table 12. Estimation of the demand for secondary teachers by small 















BSAL -2.43455 E-7 
(-.2758) 
































F 9.72 6.86 6.90 
.26 .20 .20 
D.W. 2.14 1.99 1.98 
181 181 181 
*t-statistics in parentheses. 
•Significant at five percent. 
••Significant at ten percent. 
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Table 13. Estimation of the demand for secondary teachers by medium-




Dependent variable PTES 











MIDSAL 9.78538 E-7 
(1.3861) 












































*t-statistics in parentheses. 
*Significant at five percent. 
**Significant at ten percent. 
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Table 14. Estimation of the demand for secondary teachers by large 







































































*t-statistics in parentheses. 
*Significant at five percent. 
**Significant at ten percent. 
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coefficients are negative in all cases and are significant for all 
regressions except for the estimation of the demand for elementary 
teachers by medium-sized school districts. BSAL and AVSAL, both con­
structed from the salary schedules of the school districts, had a nega­
tive effect on the demand for secondary teachers in the large and small 
districts but only one case showed significance. Both had a positive 
effect on the demand for secondary teachers within the medium-sized 
districts but only the parameter estimate for BSAL showed significance. 
Neither BSAL nor MIDSAL performed as expected in explaining the demand 
for elementary teachers, both measures' coefficient estimates positive 
and significant among large school districts, positive but not signifi­
cant for medium-sized school districts, and negative but not significant 
for small districts. 
In estimating the demand for elementary teachers, coefficient 
estimates of the budget variable had a positive sign in all cases and 
were significant across all wage specifications for the small and large 
school districts and approached significance for the medium-sized school 
districts. The two budget measures had a positive and significant effect 
on the demand for secondary teachers within the large school districts. 
Among the small school districts, the positive and significant coeffi­
cient estimates on the local funds measure were much larger in size than 
the negative coefficient estimates on the measure of state and local 
funds. Within the medium-sized districts, the two budget measures showed 
the same pattern as they did in the estimation of the demand for second­
ary teachers using the combined 23 school district sample. Parameter 
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estimates for LOCFUND were positive for small and medium-sized districts, 
although significant within the small districts only. The estimated 
coefficients for OSFUND were negative among both groups, but were 
significant only in the regressions using ÂVSÂLHS as the measure of the 
price of teacher services. 
The percentage of the population that is nonwhite, PNW, had a 
negative effect on the demand for elementary teachers for all three 
samples, however this effect was significant among medium-sized districts 
only. At the secondary level, coefficient estimates for PNW were 
negative and significant among the large school districts while they were 
positive and significant or approached significance among the small and 
medium-sized districts. The value of school property and equipment per 
pupil increased the quantity of teachers demanded in all cases. This 
effect was not significant in explaining the demand for elementary 
teachers by medium-sized districts, nor in explaining the demand for 
secondary teachers among medium and large districts. Attendance had a 
positive effect on the demand for elementary teachers. This effect was 
not significant at the ten percent level but t-statistics were greater 
than one in all but one of the regressions. Finally, coefficient 
estimates of the time trend variable were positive in all cases and 
significant in all except for explaining the demand for secondary 
teachers by small school districts. 
6. Estimation of the demand for teacher experience 
This section describes the estimation of demand functions for 
teacher quality, here quality being measured by years of teaching 
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experience. As before, the school district is assumed to be a price 
taker in the market for teacher services. Regressions for the school 
district as a whole (elementary and secondary combined), the elementary 
system, and the secondary system are performed. The data describe the 
1961 through 1972 school years. 
Four measures of teacher experience are used. LXSD, LXES, and LXHS 
represent the per student number of less experienced teachers within the 
school district, the elementary system, and the secondary system, respec­
tively. Less experienced teachers are those with four or less years of 
teaching experience. MXSD, MXES, and MXHS are the per student number of 
more experienced teachers within the school district, the elementary 
system, and the secondary system, respectively. More experienced 
teachers are those with more than four years of teaching experience. The 
four-year mark is chosen as a dividing line based upon data availability 
and a finding by Murnane (1984, pp. 516-518) that teachers with more than 
four years of teaching experience tend to have found a successful "job 
match." Those individuals who are less productive realize that they have 
made a nonoptimal job match, causing them to leave in search of a better 
job match (Jovanovic, 1979, pp. 976-977). Thus, on average the more 
experienced teachers are more productive than those less experienced as 
selective attrition of the less productive teachers has already occurred 
among the more experienced group. Also, these more experienced teachers 
have acquired human capital through on-the-job experience. 
A third measure, EXPSD, EXPSEL, and EXPSHS, total years of teaching 
experience per student within the school district, the elementary system. 
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rnd Che secondary system, respectively, is constructed by summing the 
years of teaching experience of all teachers and dividing by the number 
of students. It is constructed so as to be consistent with the form of 
the dependent variables (i.e., on a per student basis). It is 
interpreted as a measure of the average quality of teacher that students 
interact with. Finally, ATEXSD, ATEXEL, and ATEXHS, average years of 
experience per teacher within the school district, the elementary system, 
and the secondary system, respectively, are included in order to compare 
results with those of the Brown (1972) study. It is the only dependent 
variable not measured in per student terms. 
From equation (3.8), the demand functions and expected signs of the 
exogenous variables are 
(-) (?) (+) (+) (?) (?) (?) (?) 
LXSD = F(BSAL, INCEX, LOCFUND, OSFUND, PNW, PCA, VPROPSD, TREND) (3.16) 
MXSD (3.17) 
1 (?) ( - )  (+) (+) (?) (?) (?)  (?) 
EXPSD >= F(BSAL, INCEX, LOCFUND, OSFUND, PNW, PCA, VPROPSD, TREND)(3.18) 
ATEXSD (3.19) 
School districts have the option of purchasing the services of more 
or less experienced teachers. The price of the services of less 
experienced teachers is less than that of the more experienced teachers. 
However, these less experienced teachers are also assumed to be less 
productive. Thus, the quantity demanded of the less experienced 
teachers, LXSD, is expected to be lower the higher is their price, BSAL. 
BSAL is measured by the starting salary of teachers with a bachelor's 
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degree. INCEX, the price of teacher experience, is the average pay 
increment for a year of teaching experience. It is constructed from the 
salary schedules of each of the school districts. The effect of INCEX on 
the demand for LXSD depends on whether more and less experienced teachers 
are gross complements or substitutes. In estimating the demand for MXSD, 
EXPSD, and ÂTEXSD, INCEX is viewed as being the own-price of these inputs 
and is expected to have a negative sign. The sign of BSÂL in equations 
(3.17) through (3.19) depends again on whether more and less experienced 
teachers are gross complements or substitutes. Assuming that each of the 
experience measures represents a normal input in the production of 
education, both budget measures are expected to have a positive effect on 
demand. The signs of the remainder of the explanatory variables are not 
determined a priori. 
Initial model estimation indicated the presence of first-order 
autocorrelation. Durbin's two-step correction procedure was again used 
to transform the data. Regression results for the estimation of the 
demand for LXSD and MXSD using the transformed data are presented in 
Table 15. Estimates of EXPSD and ATEXSD were performed but not reported 
as the hypothesis of no linear relationship between the independent and 
dependent variables was not rejected at the ten percent significance 
level. 
F-tests indicate that both models have significant explanatory 
power, at five percent for LXSD and at ten percent for MXSD. The correc­
tion procedure removed the positive first-order autocorrelation in both 
cases. Neither of the price variables had significant explanatory powers 
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Table 15. Estimation of the demand for teacher experience by school 
districts (1961-1972) 




















































®t-statistics in parentheses. 
•Significant at five percent. 
**Significant at ten percent. 
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in the estimation of the demand for less experienced teachers. Both bud­
get measures had a positive and significant effect on the demand for LXSD 
as expected. None of the remainder of the explanatory variables were 
significant in determining the demand for less experienced teachers. 
INCEX, the experience price measure, had the expected negative sign 
but was not significant in explaining the demand for MXSD. The estimated 
coefficient for BSÂL, the base salary for teachers with a bachelor's 
degree, was negative and significant. It may be that because BSAL is a 
component of the total price of the services of an experienced teacher 
(e.g., price of the services of an experienced teacher = base salary 
+ (pay increment for a year of experience) * (years of experience)), that 
BSAL also picks up the effect the own-price of more experienced teachers 
on the demand for MXSD. Local educational funds per pupil, LOCFUND, came 
in positive and significant. The remainder of the explanatory variables 
were not significant. Both equations were estimated using a budget 
measure which combined both the local and state and federal funds per 
pupil. This had no effect on the results. 
Next, the data for the 23 school districts were broken down into 
elementary (K-6) and secondary (7-12) levels in order to see whether the 
market for teacher services differed at the two levels. The dependent 
variables used were LXES and LXHS, the number of less experienced 
teachers per pupil at the elementary and secondary levels, MXES, and 
MXHS, the number of more experienced teachers per student at the 
elementary and secondary levels, EXPSEL and EXPSHS, years of teaching 
experience per student at the elementary and secondary level, and ATEXEL 
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and ATEXHS, average years of experience per teacher at the elementary and 
secondary levels. In estimating demand at the elementary level, PCAE, 
the average percent of elementary students attending, and VPROPEL, the 
value of school property and equipment per student within the elementary 
system, were used in place of PCA and VPROPSD. Also, consistent with the 
estimation of teacher demand at the elementary level in Section C(5) of 
this chapter, the two budget measures are combined into one, TOTFUND. In 
estimating the demand for teachers at the secondary level, PCA was 
dropped and VPROPHS, the value of school property and equipment per 
secondary student, was used in place of VPROPSD. Expected coefficient 
signs are the same as before. 
The data were again transformed to correct for autocorrelation. 
Regression results for estimating the demand for ATEXHS are not reported 
as the F-test indicated the model had no explanatory power. Estimation 
results for the remainder of the experience measures are presented in 
Tables 16 and 17. First-order autocorrelation was successfully removed 
in all cases except for the demand for MXHS. 
The price variables were not significant in explaining the demand 
for less experienced teachers at the elementary or the secondary level. 
The estimated coefficients for the budget variables were positive at both 
the elementary and secondary levels, but were significant only in 
explaining LXES. PNW, the percent of the population that is nonwhite, 
had a significant negative effect on the demand for less experienced 
teachers at the elementary level while it had a positive and significant 
effect on the demand for less experienced teachers at the secondary 
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Table 16. Estimation of the demand for 
elementary level (1961-1972) 
teacher experience at the 
23 school district sample® 

































































F 3.73 3.95 6.15 3.6 
.10 .10 .15 .09 
D.W. 2.15 1.92 1.90 2.16 
n 253 253 253 253 
^t-statistics in parentheses. 
*Significant at five percent. 
**Significant at ten percent. 
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Table 17. Estimation of the demand for teacher experience at the 
secondary level (1961-1972) 
23 school district sampl e* 

















































F 2.2 4.1 3.5 
.06 .11 .09 
D.W. 1.95 1.68 1.73 
n 253 253 253 
^t-statistics in parentheses. 
*Significant at five percent. 
**Significant at ten percent. 
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level. The remainder of the explanatory variables had no significant 
effect on the demand for less experienced teachers at the elementary 
level. The value of school property and equipment per pupil was the only 
other variable to have a significant effect on the demand for less 
experienced teachers at the secondary level, this effect being positive. 
Looking at the demand for more experienced teachers, the price 
increment of experience, INCEX, has a negative but nonsignificant effect 
on the demand for more experienced teachers at the elementary level while 
the base salary, BSAL, has a significant negative effect as it did for 
the combined sample. In explaining the demand for more experienced 
teachers at the secondary level, the coefficient estimate for INCEX has 
the expected negative sign and is significant while BSAL has no 
significant explanatory power. TOTFUND, total educational funds per 
pupil, has a positive effect on the demand for MXES, but is not 
significant. Coefficient estimates for both budget measures are positive 
in the estimation of the demand for more experienced teachers at the 
secondary level, but neither is significant. When the two budget 
measures were combined into one, the total educational funds per pupil 
had a significant positive effect on the demand for MXHS with little 
change in the other parameter estimates. 
PSW, the percent of the population that is nonwhite, had no 
significant effect on the demand for more experienced teachers at either 
level. The value of school property and equipment per pupil had a 
positive and significant effect in the demand for more experienced 
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teachers at the elementary level but was insignificant in explaining the 
demand for more experienced teachers at the secondary level. 
Estimation of the years of teaching experience per student at the 
two levels, EXPSEL and EXPSHS, yielded results consistent with those from 
the estimation of the demand for more experienced teachers. At the 
elementary level, the only noticeable difference was that PNW became a 
significant explanatory variable. It had a positive effect on the demand 
for EXPSEL. At the secondary level, the price increment of experience, 
INCEX, lost its significance while one of the budget variables, OSFUND, 
became significant. 
Finally, in estimating the demand for ATEXEL, average years of 
experience per elementary teacher, it was expected that the parameter 
estimates would follow the same pattern as those in the estimation of the 
demand for MXES and EXPSEL. This, however, did not occur. INCEX again 
did not have any significant explanatory power. The coefficient estimate 
for BSAL was positive but not significant which differed from its effect 
in explaining MXES and EXPSEL. This finding is consistent with expecta­
tions as BSAL represents the price the school district must pay for 
inexperienced teachers, a potential substitute for experienced teachers. 
The budget measure, TOTFUND, had significant explanatory power but was of 
the wrong sign. The only other explanatory variable that showed 
significance was the time trend variable. Its coefficient estimate was 
negative which is consistent with the other regression results for the 
elementary system. 
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Brown (1972) found that an average salary measure, the average of 
actual salaries paid, had a positive and significant effect on the demand 
for average teacher experience by school districts. He considered this 
to be an unexpected result. Put within the context of this study which 
uses two prices in the estimation of the demand for teacher experience, 
his finding may have resulted from the use of a single price variable. 
If that price variable picked up the effect of the price of inexperienced 
teachers, a potential substitute for experienced teachers, a positive 
coefficient estimate could be a reasonable outcome. 
The data were broken down into three groups, small, medium-sized, 
and large school districts as in Section C(3) of this chapter. However, 
the regression results yielded no additional information and thus are not 
reported here. 
7. Estimation of the demand for teacher educational preparation 
This section describes the estimation of demand functions for 
teacher quality, this time quality being measured by the teacher's level 
of educational preparation. Again, the school district is assumed to be 
a price taker in the market for teacher services. Regressions for the 
school district as a whole (elementary and secondary levels combined), 
the elementary system, and the secondary system are performed. The data 
describe the 1961 through 1972 school years. It is again transformed 
using Durbin's two-step procedure to correct for positive first-order 
autorcorrelation. 
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Three levels of educational preparation are considered. LDS 
represents the number of teachers in the school district who do not 
possess a bachelor's degree. BDS measures the number of teachers in the 
school district who possess a bachelor's degree. Finally, the number of 
teachers in the school district with a master's or higher degree is 
represented by HDS. All three measures are in per pupil terms. It is 
assumed that teachers who possess higher levels of educational prepara­
tion have acquired greater levels of human capital and thus are more 
productive in the production of education by the school system. 
From equation (3.8) the demand functions to be estimated, along with 
the expected signs of the exogenous variables, are as follows: 
(-) (?) (+) (+) (?) (?) (?) (?) 
LDS = F(BSAL, INCED, LOCFUND, OSFUND, PNW, PCA, VPROPSD, TREND). (3.20) 
(-) (?) (+) (+) (?) (?) (?) (?) 
BDS = F(BSAL, INCED, LOCFUND, OSFUND, PNW, PCA, VPROPSD, TREND). (3.21) 
(?) (-) (+) (+) (?) (?) (?) (+) 
HDS = F(BSAL, INCED, LOCFUND, OSFUND, PNW, PCA, VPROPSD, TREND). (3.22) 
BSAL is the base salary paid to beginning teachers with a bachelor's 
degree. No information concerning the price of the services of teachers 
with less than a bachelor's degree was available. Thus, BSAL serves as 
the own-price of the services of teachers with less than a bachelor's 
degree and of those with a bachelor's degree. As such, it is expected to 
have a negative effect on the demand for these two categories of teacher. 
In estimating the demand for teachers with higher degrees, HDS, BSAL 
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represents the price of another variable input. Its sign depends on 
whether the inputs are gross complements or substitutes. 
INCED represents the increased price that school districts must pay 
in order to purchase the services of teachers with higher educational 
degrees. It is constructed from the salary schedules of each of the 
school districts and is the average salary increment to teachers with a 
master's degree. It represents the price of other inputs in equations 
(3.20) and (3.21) and thus its sign depends on the gross complementarity 
or substitutability of the inputs. It comes in as the own-price of 
teachers with higher degrees and thus is expected to have a negative sign 
in equation (3.22). Assuming that all three categories of teacher are 
normal inputs in the production of education, both budget measures are 
expected to have positive signs in equations (3.20) through (3.22). 
Presuming that credentialism was occurring within the education industry 
during the period examined, it is expected that the time trend variable 
should have a positive effect on the demand for teachers with higher 
levels of educational preparation. 
Regression results from the estimation of the demand for LDS, BDS, 
and EDS are presented in Table 18. In the estimation of the demand 
function for teachers with less than a bachelor's degree, the coefficient 
estimate on the base salary variable had the expected negative sign and 
approached significance at the ten percent level. The other price 
variables proved to have no significant explanatory power. Both of the 
budget variables had the expected positive signs, but LOCFUND, local 
educational funds per pupil, was the only one that was significant. The 
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Table 18. Estimation of the demand for teacher educational preparation 
by school districts (1961-1972) 
23 school district sample a 























































F 3.73 5.06 15.30 
.09 .11 .28 
D.W. 1.75 2.11 1.95 
n 322 322 322 
^t-statistics in parentheses. 
*Significant at five percent. 
**Significant at ten percent. 
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time trend variable was the only other exogenous variable that had 
significant explanatory power. It was negative, indicating that 
unmeasured factors that changed over the period caused fewer teachers 
without a bachelor's degree to be demanded on a per student basis. 
BSÂL, the starting salary for teachers with a bachelor's degree, had 
a significant negative effect on the quantity demanded of teachers with a 
bachelor's degree as was expected. The price increment for the services 
of teachers with higher educational degrees was not significant. Both 
budget variables had significant positive coefficient estimates. The 
only other variable with significant explanatory powers was the time 
trend variable which was negative in this case also. 
The demand for teachers with a master's degree or Ph.D. was not 
responsive to either of the price variables. Both budget variables had 
positive signs, but only LOCFUND was significant. The percent of the 
population that is nonwhite, PNW, had a significant negative effect on 
the demand for HDS. This was the only regression of the three in which 
PNW showed significance. Finally, the time trend variable had a positive 
significant effect on the demand for teachers with higher degrees. This 
indicates that the unmeasured factors that changed over time caused the 
school district to substitute away from teachers with a bachelor's degree 
or less towards those with higher levels of educational preparation. 
The data were broken down into elementary and secondary levels to 
see if the market for the services of teachers with various levels of 
educational preparation differed at the two levels. As the results 
differed little from those in Table 18, they are not reported here. 
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Also, the data were broken down into the three school district groups, 
small, medium-sized, and large districts. Again, the regression results 
yielded no additional information and so are not reported here. 
C. Summary 
This chapter examined the demand for teachers by public school 
districts assuming that school districts were price takers in the market 
for teacher services. Previous studies which have assumed the price of 
teacher services to be exogenous to the school district have found the 
demand for teachers to be price inelastic (Ehrenberg, 1973, pp. 272-275; 
Brown, 1972, pp. 210-214) or to be not significantly affected by the 
price of teacher services (Boardman et al., 1982, pp. 142-145). 
Demand functions for teachers were first estimated for the whole 
school district and then for elementary and secondary teachers 
separately. Next, the data set was broken down into small, medium, and 
large school districts and the same demand functions were estimated in 
order to see if the demand for teachers varied with district size. 
In estimating teacher demand, three specifications of the price of 
teachers services were used. Of the three, only the average of actual 
salaries paid had consistently significant coefficient estimates of the 
expected sign. Neither of the other two measures, constructed from the 
salary schedules, performed well in explaining teacher demand. This 
seems to indicate that the average salary measure best captures the cost 
of teacher services faced by school districts. The average of actual 
salaries paid does reflect the current education and experience mix of a 
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school district's teachers. It also includes compensation for items not 
reflected in the salary schedule such as pay increments for coaching 
duties or additional administrative responsibilities. To the extent that 
teachers at the margin possess the same education and experience mix and 
will receive similar job responsibilities as the average teacher, the 
average salary measure will reflect the marginal cost of teachers to the 
school district. 
Results from the regressions using the average actual salary measure 
are employed to calculate the price elasticity of demand for teachers. 
It was assumed that the budget for current educational expenditures was 
determined exogenously. Thus, the price elasticities which can be 
derived are, using Ehrenberg's (1973, pp. 371-375) terminology, partial 
price elasticities of demand. Ehrenberg, using pooled cross-section and 
time-series data observed at the state level, found that the budget for 
current educational expenditures increased in response to an increase in 
the price of educational manpower. If the same result were to hold true 
for the state of Maryland, it would imply that the elasticity measures 
derived here serve as upper bound estimates on the absolute values of the 
whole (variable budget) price elasticities. The price elasticities are 
calculated at the mean values of the teacher-student ratios and price 
measures. Table 19 presents the estimated elasticities while Table 20 
contains the mean values of the relevant variables. 
Consistent with the results found by Brown (1972) and Ehrenberg 
(1973), the demand for teachers was found to be price inelastic. 
Estimates varied across schooling levels and school district sizes. 
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Table 19. Estimates of the price elasticities of demand for teachers (n) 














School district -.185 
Elementary -.203 









E^lasticity not calculated as a result of a nonsignificant parameter 
estimate. 
Table 20. Means of variables 
Medium-
Small sized Large 
Whole school school school 
Variable sample districts districts districts 
PTS .04968843 .05079481 .04834884 .0505481 
PTES .04341985 .04378641 .04212975 .0458203 
PTHS .05416648 .05559456 .05328474 .0531577 
AVSALSD* 9674 .85 9108 .25 9674 .04 10951 .73 
AVSALEL* 9539 .20 9061 .67 9565 .92 10546 .87 
AVSALHS* 9897 .14 9280 .72 9905 .35 11263 .55 
T^he prices of teacher services are in 1972 dollars. 
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ranging from an estimated price elasticity of demand of -.198 for 
secondary teachers by small school districts to -.417 for elementary 
teachers in those same small school districts. However, all were 
strongly price inelastic, which indicates that teacher organizations, if 
they possessed sufficient bargaining power, could push for salary 
increases while suffering minimal disemployment effects. 
The current educational budget variables were expected to have a 
positive effect on the demand for teachers. Two measures were used, 
local funds per pupil and combined state and federal funds per pupil. It 
was expected that the two sources might have differing effects on teacher 
demand as the outside dollars might have been targeted towards special 
programs and thus have their uses restricted. This results was not born 
out at the elementary level, thus a single, total budget measure was used 
which performed as expected. Both budget measures were used in 
estimating the demand for secondary teachers and the total demand for 
teachers by the school district. Coefficient estimates for the local 
funds variable always had the expected positive sign, however they did 
not have significant explanatory power in a number of regressions. 
Coefficient estimates for outside funds had the wrong sign in most 
regressions and were significant or approached significance in a number 
of those regressions. It may be that the direction of causality flows 
not only from outside funds to teachers but also from teachers to outside 
funds. One goal in the allocation of federal and state educational 
dollars is to achieve equality in educational opportunity across school 
districts. If these outside funds are targeted towards disadvantaged 
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districts and the disadvantaged districts exhibit low teacher-student 
ratios, this may account for the unexpected results. 
Of the remaining outside variables, the attendance, value of school 
property, and time trend variables came in positively and were 
significant in a number of regressions. The percent of the population of 
the school district that is nonwhite was significant in a number of 
regressions, but the sign of its coefficient estimates varied over 
schooling levels and district sizes. 
The models were less successful in estimating the demand for teacher 
education and experience levels as evidenced by the low R-squared and F-
statistics. Positive first-order autocorrelation had to be corrected for 
in all regressions. This is not surprising since education and 
experience levels change slowly from year to year. A bright spot was 
that at least one of the price variables was significant in a number of 
the regressions and the budget variables had positive coefficient 
estimates (with one exception) and were significant or approached 
significance in the majority of the regressions. 
Both Brown (1972, pp. 198-219) and Boardman et al. (1982, pp. 127-
145) had found average salaries to have a positive effect on the demand 
for teachers of higher educational levels. Boardman et al. found the 
same result for teacher experience levels. This study improves on the 
previous studies in two ways. First, the dependent variables used are in 
per pupil terras, consistent with the model. The experience measure used 
by Boardman et al. was average years of experience per teacher. The 
demand for average teacher experience was estimated here in order to 
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compare results (Table 16). It performed the poorest of the experience 
measures in terms of the signs of the coefficient estimates being 
consistent with expectations. Brown and Boardman et al. both used the 
percentage of teachers with a master's degree as an independent variable. 
Here, teacher-student ratios for teachers with less than a bachelor's 
degree, a bachelor's degree, and a master's or higher degree were used as 
dependent variables. Coefficient estimates on the base teacher salary 
were negative for all three regressions, being significant in one and 
approaching significance in another. 
The second difference between this and the previous studies was in 
the choice of price variables. Brown and Boardman et al. used the 
average of actual salaries paid as a price variable. Here, two price 
variables were used in each regression, both constructed from the school 
districts' salary schedules. The base salary for teachers was used to 
estimate both the demand for teacher experience and the demand for 
teacher educational levels. The average increment to the base salary for 
a year of teaching experience was used in estimating the demand for 
teacher experience while the pay increment to a master's degree (relative 
to a bachelor's degree) was used to estimate the demand for teacher 
education levels. Regression results suggest that the findings by Brown 
and Boardman et al. may have resulted from their use of a poor price 
measure rather than a positive relationship between teacher prices and 
the demand for teacher education and experience levels. 
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IV. DETERMINATION OF THE TEACHER-STUDENT RATIO AND THE PRICE 
FUNCTION OF TEACHER SERVICES USING HEDONIC METHODOLOGY 
TO MODEL TEACHER-SCHOOL DISTRICT TRANSACTIONS 
A. Model 
1. Introduction 
This section examines the possibility that both the price of teacher 
services and the teacher-student ratio may be endogenous to the school 
district. Literature concerning the effects of collective bargaining 
between teachers and public school systems (Perry, 1979, and Hall and 
Carroll, 1973), has provided evidence that teachers view class size as an 
indicator of the quality of their work environment. If teachers perceive 
small class sizes (large teacher-student ratios) as a desirable job 
characteristic and are willing to accept lower pay for such a condition, 
all else equal, then the school district finds itself simultaneously 
determining its teacher-student ratio and the price that it pays for 
teacher services. As the price of teacher services increases, the school 
district demands a smaller quantity of teacher services. However, as the 
teacher-student ratio increases (i.e., class sizes become smaller), 
school districts find that they can pay a lower price for teacher 
services since the quality of work environment that they offer has 
improved. 
The model that follows describes the simultaneous determination of 
the price of teacher services and the teacher-student ratio by school 
districts. It combines the model of teacher demand developed in 
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Chapter III with an hedonic modeling of labor market transactions 
between teachers and school districts originally used by Antos and Rosen 
(1975). 
As described in Chapter III, the superintendent of the school 
district is charged with maximizing the production of education subject 
to the budget that he is given to work with. QC, the average level of 
educational services produced per student, is described by an educational 
production function of the form 
QC = Q(0 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) (4.1) 
1 S p a 
The arguments of the production function were justified in Section A 
of Chapter III. 0^ is a vector representing the number of teachers of 
type i(i=l, ..., Z), per student. 0^ is a vector of (nonteacher) 
school district characteristics that contribute to the production of 
education by the school district. It describes the physical learning 
environment facing the school district's students. 0^ contains relevant 
pupil characteristics that capture their ability and prior learning 
experiences. Finally, 0^ is a vector of characteristics of the students' 
home and community environment. The only arguments of the production 
function that are subject to the superintendent's control are the number 
of teachers of each type. School district, pupil, home environment, and 
community characteristics, as well as the number of students in the 
district, are exogenous to the superintendent. 
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Local government officials present the superintendent with the 
budget for current educational expenditures. The superintendent uses 
to purchase the services of various types of teachers so as to maximize 
the average educational services produced per student. School districts 
are assumed to pay a market determined equilibrium price for teacher 
services which is described by the price-characteristics function. This 
function has both teacher and school district characteristics as its 
arguments. 
2. Price-characteristics function 
The price of teacher services was assumed to be solely determined by 
the market in Chapter III. In Chapter III, the price of different types 
of teachers depended only upon their level of educational preparation and 
experience. Here, the transaction between teachers and school districts 
is viewed as being more complex. Teachers receive compensation for their 
services partially in the form of p, the price of teacher services. The 
remainder is received through the satisfaction or dissatisfaction they 
derive from the quality of their work environment. Antos and Rosen 
(1975, p. 123) view the transaction between teachers and school districts 
as follows. 
Teachers sell the services of their labor, but simultaneously 
purchase utility-bearing characteristics of the schools in 
which they work. On the other side of the bargain, school 
administrators purchase desired teacher services and jointly 
sell characteristics of schools and students to their teachers. 
Every contract quotes a price for the total package of labor 
services and on-the-job consumption, and the content of the 
package varies from school (district) to school (district). 
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Thus, a school district enters the market for teacher services 
possessing 0^, a vector of school district characteristics which yield 
utility or disutility to teachers. Some, but not necessarily all of the 
elements of 8^, the vector of school district characteristics that enter 
the educational production function, may be included in 6^. Also, some 
of the elements of may be subject to the control of the superinten­
dent. Each teacher enters the market possessing 6^, a vector of 
characteristics that indicate his or her desirability to school 
districts. Market equilibrium is reached when the supply and demand for 
teachers interact to determine prices for teacher and school district 
characteristics that clear the market. In equilibrium, the price-
characteristics function that is observed across schools and teachers is 
consistent with the supply and demand functions for teachers at each 
school (Antos and Rosen, 1975, p. 125). It is of the form 
p = p(0g, Gg). (4.2) 
3. Teacher behavior 
Teachers are assumed to be utility maximizers. Each has a utility 
function of the form 
U = U(c, 0g) (4.3) 
where c is a numeraire representing consumption and 0^ is the vector of 
school district characteristics which yield utility or disutility to 
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teachers. A teacher with relevant characteristics 0 maximizes (4.3) 
c 
subject to the constraint 
c = p(8g, 9^) + y (4.4) 
where y represents outside income. Teachers view the price-
characteristics function as being exogenous to their decisions. They 
choose a school district by comparing the price the market places upon 
school characteristics with their subjective valuation of those 
characteristics. If ©„ consists of n characteristics, e,, ..., e , then 
at the margin a teacher with characteristics will choose the school 
district that satisfies 
9p(G , 0 ) -3U/3e. 
^ 3U/3c ' 1 = 1, ..., n. (4.5) 
For the optimal vector of school characteristics, G^*, evaluation of 
3p(0g*, 0^) 
= Pg yields the price the marginal teacher is willing to pay 
i i 
for the marginal unit of e.. If p is greater than zero, then e. is a 
1 Ci 1 
"bad" which the marginal teacher must be compensated for. If p^ is less 
i 
than zero, e^ is a "good" which the marginal teacher is willing to pay 
for in the form of a lower price of teacher services (Antos and Rosen, 
1975, p. 126). 
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4. School district behavior 
The school district superintendent maximizes the average level of 
educational services provided to students by allocating the budget that 
he receives for current educational expenditures among purchases of the 
services of the z types of teachers. It is assumed here that teachers 
are the only discretionary inputs of the educational production function. 
The price of each type of teacher to a school district is indicated by 
the price-characteristics function. The price of the services of a 
teacher of type i, i = 1, ..., z, depends on the relevant characteristics 
of the school district and the characteristics of type i teachers. Let 
the price of type i teachers be represented as 
Pi = ®c^' (4.6) 
This framework for modeling the price of teacher services differs 
from that used in Chapter III by the fact that here, not just teacher 
characteristics, but school characteristics also affect the price that a 
school district must pay for teacher services. 
It is assumed that one element of 0^, the vector of characteristics 
that describes the quality of a school district's work environment, is 
the average class size within the district. Note that average class size 
is the inverse of the district's teacher-student ratio. It is assumed 
that teachers prefer smaller class sizes as they entail less paperwork 
and fewer disciplinary problems. According to (4.5), school districts 
that provide smaller class sizes (i.e., larger teacher-student ratios) 
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should find that they can pay lower prices for teacher services, all else 
equal. Teachers are willing to pay for smaller class sizes through 
acceptance of lower wages in order to receive the utility from such a 
characteristic. 
Thus, the superintendent maximizes (4.1) subject to the budget for 
current educational expenditures, and the price of the services of 
each type of teacher as described by (4.6). This can be represented as 
£ = Q(0^, 0^. 0 , 0g) + A[Bg - I p.(Gg, 0^) . Tj (4.7) 
^ i=l 
Differentiation of (4.7) with respect to the z types of teachers and 
the lagrangian multiplier yields first-order conditions of the form 
3(T./s) " 3(tT7S7 ~ S'A'[Pi(0E, + _I^(T^/s) 3(1/5)^ 1 = 0- (4-8) 
II- = BE - f p.(0E, 8 ) . T. = 0. (4.9) 
1=1 
Note that the marginal cost of purchasing the services of an 
additional teacher is equal to the price of that teacher less the 
reduction in expenditures as all teachers within the district are willing 
to accept lower pay in response to improved working conditions as class 
sizes become smaller. If second-order conditions for a maximum are 
satisfied, then the system of equations described by (4.8) and (4.9) 
determine the optimal number of teachers of each type demanded per 
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student, that is (T^/s) for i = 1, z. Demand functions are of the 
form 
T./s = T.^(pi(0e» ••• Pz^E' *c)' V®' ®s' ®p' 
i  =  1 ,  . z .  ( 4 . 1 0 )  
Note that the prices of various types of teachers are not exogenous 
to the school district as they depend on the school district's overall 
teacher-student ratio, T/s. The next section will discuss the empirical 
techniques used to estimate the demand functions described by (4.10) 
along with the price-characteristics function in light of the 
simultaneous determination of both by school districts. 
B. Model Estimation 
1. Functional forms 
This section describes the empirical model used to describe the 
price-characteristics and teacher demand functions derived in the 
previous section- Separate functions will be estimated for elementary 
and secondary level teachers. All variables measured in dollars are in 
constant 1972 dollars. 
The price-characteristics function represented by equation (4.2) 
will be estimated as 
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AVSALEL = P(PTES, PNW, VPROPEL, NPROMEL, CI, 
• • • > C23 
ATEXEL, HIDGREL, TREND) (4.11) 
and 
AVSALHS = P(PTHS, PNW, VPROPHS, NPROMHS, CI, 
• • • » 
C23, ATEXHS 
HIDGRHS, TREND) (4.12) 
The dependent variables, AVSALEL and AVSALHS, are the averages of 
actual salaries paid to elementary and secondary level teachers, 
respectively. The variables PTES through C23 and PTHS through C23 are 
teachers derive positive or negative utility. PTES and PTHS are the 
teacher-student ratios within the elementary and secondary levels, 
respectively. PNW is the percent of the population served by the school 
district that is nonwhite. VPROPEL and VPROPHS are the value of school 
property and equipment per student at the elementary and secondary 
levels, respectively. NPROMEL and NPROMHS are the percentages of 
students at the elementary and secondary levels that are not promoted 
during the current year. CI through C23 are zero-one school district 
dummy variables defined such that 
measures of 0^, the vector of school district characteristics from which 
1 for the i-th school district, and 
(4.13) 
0 otherwise. 
These dummy variables are included to capture the effect that 
unmeasured school district characteristics have on the price of teacher 
services faced by that school district. 
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ATEXEL and ATEXHS are the average years of teaching experience per 
teacher within the elementary and secondary school systems, repsectively. 
HIDGREL and HIDGRHS are the percentages of teachers with a Master's 
degree or higher within the elementary and secondary systems, respec­
tively. These experience and educational background variables represent 
the teacher characteristics that school districts desire to purchase. 
Finally, TREND, a time trend variable, is included to capture the effect 
of changes in any unmeasured teacher or school district characteristics 
that change over time. 
The elements of the vector of school district characteristics, 
yield either utility or disutility to teachers. As described by equation 
(4.5), the partial derivative of the price-characteristics function with 
respect to a desirable school district characteristic is negative while 
the partial derivative with respect to an undesirable school district is 
positive. It is expected that the teacher-student ratios and the values 
of school property and equipment per pupil are perceived as desirable 
characteristics by teachers. Teachers are assumed to be willing to 
receive a lower price for their services, all else equal, from school 
districts that offer smaller average class sizes and more and/or better 
quality facilities. Thus, estimation of (4.11) and (4.12) is expected to 
yield negative coefficient estimates for those variables. The teacher 
experience and educational preparation variables are assumed to be viewed 
as desirable teacher characteristics by school districts and thus are 
expected to have positive coefficient estimates. 
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The demand functions Co be estimated are similar to those employed 
in Chapter III. The demand functions for elementary and secondary 
teachers are estimated separately and are of the form 
PTES = T(AVSALEL, LOCFUND, OSFUND, PNW, PCAE, VPROPEL, TREND) (4.14) 
and 
PTES = T(AVSALHS, LOCFUND, OSFUND, PNW, FYCOL, VPROPHS, TREND). (4.15) 
PTES and PTES are the teacher-student ratios at the elementary and 
secondary levels, respectively. AVSALEL and AVSALHS are the averages of 
actual salaries paid to elementary and secondary teachers. LOCFUND and 
OSFUND represent local and combined state and federal funds for current 
educational expenditures on a per pupil basis. PNW is the percent of the 
population served by the school district that is nonwhite. PCAE is the 
average percent of pupils attending at the elementary level while FYCOL 
is the percent of the population served by the school district that has 
completed at least four years of college. These two measures are 
included to control for the effect of the students' home environment on 
teacher demand. FYCOL is used instead of a pupil attendance measure at 
the secondary level as attendance at the secondary level is more likely 
to be a choice variable of students rather than a reflection of parental 
attitudes. Nonteacher school district characteristics are captured by 
VPROPEL and VPROPHS, the value of school property and equipment per pupil 
at the elementary and secondary levels, respectively. Finally, the time 
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trend variable, TREND, is included to capture the effect of changes in 
any nonmeasured demand determinants. 
As in Chapter III, the price of teacher services is expected to have 
a negative effect on the demand for teacher services by school districts. 
Thus, the coefficient estimates of AVSÂLEL and AVSÂLHS are expected to be 
negative. Also, both budget variables are again expected to have a 
positive effect on the demand for teacher services. The remainder of the 
variables are included to control for the effects of student, school, 
community, and home environment characteristics on the demand for teacher 
services. 
Equations (4.11) and (4.14), and (4.12) and (4.15) describe two 
simultaneous equation systems. Two-stage least squares is used to 
estimate both systems. Estimation results are discussed in the next 
section. 
2, Empirical results 
The two systems of equations were estimated using two-stage least 
squares. For each equation at the elementary and secondary levels, three 
regressions were performed. The first used observations from the 23 
school districts for the 1961 through 1972 school years. This is the 
full period sample. The data were then broken down into two periods—the 
1961 through 1969 and the 1970 through 1972 school years. This was done 
because beginning with the 1969-1970 school year, all school districts 
were required by law to negotiate collective bargaining agreements with 
teachers* organizations if teachers within the school district indicated 
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their desire for such representation. Robert Haugen (Maryland State 
Teachers* Association, Baltimore, Maryland, 1985, interview) stated that 
prior to the 1970 school year, no collective bargaining agreement existed 
between the 23 school districts and teacher organizations. Beginning 
with the 1969-1970 school year, collective bargaining agreements were in 
place between National Education Association-affiliated teacher 
organizations and the 23 school districts. This situation continued to 
exist throughout the period that this study examines. To the extent that 
teachers' unions were successful in negotiating for desirable work 
conditions, it is expected that school district characteristics should 
have a more pronounced effect on the price of teacher services in the 
unionized period, 1970 through 1972, than in the nonunionized period, 
1961 through 1969. 
Results from the estimation of the price-characteristics functions 
for elementary and secondary teachers are presented in Tables 21 and 22. 
The school district dummy variables were used to estimate the functions 
but their coefficient estimates are not reported here. The models have 
significant explanatory powers at both school levels and for all samples. 
The data had to be transformed to correct for positive first-order 
autocorrelation in the estimation of the price-characteristics function 
for secondary teachers when the full period sample, the 1961 through 1972 
school years, was used. Durbin's two-step correction procedure, 
described in Section B(3) of Chapter III, was used to transform the data 
for that regression. 
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Table 21- Two-stage least squares estimation of the price-characteris­
tics function for elementary teachers (1961-1972) 




































































^t-statistics in parentheses. 
*Significant at five percent. 
**Significant at ten percent. 
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Table 22. Two-stage least squares estimation of the price-characteris-
tics function for secondary teachers (1961-1972) 
Dependent variable AVSALHS® 
1961-1972 1961-1969 1970-1972 







































































t-statistics in parentheses. 
•Significant at five percent. 
••Significant at ten percent. 
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It was expected that a higher teacher-student ratio, which indicates 
a lower average class size, would cause the price of teacher services to 
be lower, all else equal. For the full sample, estimated coefficients 
for the teacher-student ratios at the elementary and secondary levels are 
positive and significant, contrary to expectations. Coefficient 
estimates for these variables are also positive using the nonunionized 
period sample, but only the parameter estimate for PTES has significant 
explanatory power. However, when regressions are performed using the 
unionized period sample, the estimated coefficients for the teacher-
student ratios have negative signs and are significant at both the 
elementary and secondary levels. This suggests that the expected trade­
off between smaller class sizes and the price of teacher services did 
occur once collective bargaining agreements between school districts and 
teachers' organizations were in place. In the union period, it is 
estimated that elementary teachers were willing to accept a 5.5 percent 
lower price for their services in return for a ten percent increase in 
the teacher-student ratio at the elementary level while secondary 
teachers were willing to accept a 2.8 percent decrease in the price 
received for their services in return for a ten percent increase in the 
teacher-student ratio at the secondary level. 
It was also expected that teachers would accept a lower price for 
their services from school districts with more and/or better quality 
facilities, all else equal. This would imply negative coefficient 
estimates for the variables VPROPEL and VPROPHS. This result was 
obtained in all cases but one, that being the estimate of the price-
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characteristics function for elementary teachers using the sample from 
the unionized period. There, VPROPEL had a positive sign and was 
significant at the ten percent level. The coefficient estimates for 
these measures of the quality of the school's facilities had the expected 
negative sign in the other five regressions, two of these coefficient 
estimates being significant. The parameter estimates for the other 
school characteristics had mixed effects. The nonpromotion measure had 
negative coefficient estimates at both the elementary and secondary level 
in the nonunion period. This variable was significant at the elementary 
level and approached significance at the secondary level. 
Of the two measures of teacher characteristics, average years of 
experience per teacher performed better at both the elementary and the 
secondary levels. Coefficient estimates for the experience variable were 
positive and had significant explanatory power in four of the six 
regressions. The measure of teachers' educational backgrounds did not 
have significant explanatory power in any of the regressions. Finally, 
the regressions were also run excluding the experience and education 
measures due to their potential endogeneity. Those regressions had 
slightly lower F-statistic and R-squared values but coefficient estimates 
did not change appreciably and so the results are not presented here. 
The time trend variable indicated that unmeasured factors that 
changed over time caused the real price of teacher services at both the 
elementary and secondary levels to increase during the 1961 through 1969 
school years and to decrease during the 1970 through 1972 school years. 
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This variable was significant during both periods and at both schooling 
levels. 
It was not possible to do a Chow test in order to test whether the 
samples from the nonunionized and unionized periods came from the same 
population as different correction factors were used to transform the 
data to correct for positive first-order autocorrelation for the 
different samples. However, the change in the signs of the coefficient 
estimates for PTES and PTHS from the nonunionized period to the unionized 
period samples suggest that such a breakdown is warranted, especially 
since the coefficient estimates are significant for both periods. 
Results from the estimation of the demand for elementary and 
secondary teachers using two-stage least squares are presented in 
Tables 23 and 24. The data transformation described in Section B(3) of 
Chapter III is used to correct for positive first-order autocorrelation 
for each regression. Again, at each schooling level, regressions are 
performed using the full period sample, which spans the 1961 through 1972 
school years, the nonunionized period sample, which includes the 1961 
through 1969 school years, and the unionized period sample, which covers 
the 1970 through 1972 school years. The estimated model of the demand 
for secondary teachers during the unionized period was the only model 
that did not have significant explanatory power. 
Measures of the price of teacher services, AVSALEL and AVSALHS, had 
a negative effect on the demand for teacher services in all six regres­
sions. This result was significant for all regressions except those 
estimating the demand for elementary teachers using the full sample and 
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Table 23. Two-stage least squares estimation of the demand for 
elementary teachers (1961-1972) 





































































^t-statistics in parentheses. 
•Significant at five percent. 
**Significant at ten percent. 
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Table 24. Two-stage least squares 
secondary teachers (1961 
estimation of the 
-1972) 
demand for 























































F 9.46 9.33 1.53 
.21 .27 .22 
D.W. 2.12 2.06 1.69 
253 184 46 
®t-statistics in parentheses. 
•Significant at five percent. 
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the nonunioaized period samples. Coefficient estimates for both budget 
measures were positive and significant as expected in all cases but the 
regression estimating the demand for secondary teachers during the 
unionized period. The variables included to control for school, student, 
community, and home environment characteristics, PNW, PCAE, FYCOL, 
VPROPEL, and VPROPHS, behaved essentially as they had in the single-stage 
estimation of teacher demand in Chapter III. Finally, the time trend 
variable indicated that unmeasured determinants of teacher demand that 
changed over time caused the demand for elementary teachers to increase 
over the 1961 through 1969 period and to decrease over the 1970 through 
1972 period. This time trend variable also indicated an increase in the 
demand for secondary teachers over the earlier period and a decrease in 
demand over the later period. However, the coefficient estimates for the 
time trend variable were significant only in the earlier period sample. 
3. Conclusion 
This chapter examined the possibility that school districts face an 
endogenous price of teacher services. Through the hedonic modeling of a 
price-characteristics function, it was hypothesized that school districts 
that offer teachers smaller class sizes are able to pay a lower price for 
teacher services, all else equal. Two-stage least squares estimation of 
the price-characteristics functions for elementary and secondary level 
teachers using data from the 1961 through 1972 school years did not 
support this hypothesis. The data were then broken down into two time 
periods, a nonunionized period and a period when the terms and conditions 
of employment were defined by collective bargaining agreements negotiated 
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by each school district and teachers' union. The expectation was that if 
a teachers* union was effective in serving as a collective voice for its 
members and if the members viewed smaller class sizes as a desirable work 
characteristic, then estimation of the price-characteristics function 
during the later time period, the 1970 through 1972 school years, should 
provide evidence of the tradeoff between the price of teacher services 
and class sizes. Estimation results for the nonunion period yielded no 
evidence of such a tradeoff. However, regressions using the data from 
when collective bargaining agreements were in force did show evidence of 
the expected tradeoff at both the elementary and secondary levels. 
Consistent with the hypothesized endogeneity of the price of teacher 
services, two-stage least squares estimations of the demand for elemen­
tary and secondary teachers were performed. The explanatory variables 
exhibited essentially the same pattern of significance as they had in 
Chapter III under the assumption that school districts were price takers 
in the market for teacher services. In Table 23, the price of teacher 
services was not found to have a significant effect on the demand for 
elementary teachers in the nonunion period. It did have a negative and 
significant coefficient estimate in the union period. This might have 
been a result of unions having differing degrees of effectiveness in the 
collective bargaining process. If the more effective unions were able to 
achieve wage increases, causing those school districts to decrease their 
teacher-student ratios, this may have accounted for the coefficient 
estimate on AVSALEL taking on significant explanatory power in the union 
period. 
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V. SCHOOL DISTRICTS AS MONOPSONISTS IN THE MARKET 
FOR TEACHER SERVICES 
A. Introduction 
The previous two chapters have proceeded under the assumption that 
school districts purchase teacher services within the framework of a 
competitive market. In Chapter III, school districts were assumed to 
face a perfectly elastic supply of teacher services at a market deter­
mined price. In Chapter IV, market competition determined the parameters 
of the price-characteristics function faced by school districts. The 
price of teacher services was endogenous to the school district since it 
was able to control the mix of the compensation package received by its 
teachers, that is, the amount of compensation provided in the form of job 
characteristics versus monetary remuneration. However, the total size of 
the compensation package in terms of the satisfaction the marginal 
teacher derived from it was still determined in the market. 
Here, school districts will be assumed to possess monopsony power in 
the market for teacher services. Landon and Baird (1971, pp. 68-70) 
provided evidence that in metropolitan areas served by relatively few 
school districts, these school districts exert a degree of monopsony 
power in the market for the services for first-year teachers. In an ad 
hoc fashion, they modeled and estimated base teacher salaries as a 
function of a school district's ability to pay, tastes for education, and 
degree of monopsony power. The logarithm of the number of school 
districts in the county that the school district is located in was used 
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to indicate the degree of monopsony power possessed by the school 
district. It was assumed that a smaller number of school districts per 
county would imply a less competitive market for teacher services, 
causing the price of teacher services to be lower. This measure did have 
a significant positive coefficient estimate in school districts with 
between 25,000 and 100,000 students which Landon and Baird took as 
evidence of monopsony power. Boardman et al. (1982, p. 147) found 
evidence of monopsony power among Pennsylvania school districts. They 
modeled the supply and demand for teacher services and estimated the 
supply price of teacher services as a function of the teacher-student 
ratio and the job and locational characteristics of the school district. 
Using two-stage least squares, they found the teacher-student ratio to 
have a positive effect on average teacher salaries. Boardman et al. 
claimed that this provided evidence that the school districts studied did 
face upward-sloping supply schedules as a result of their possession of a 
degree of monopsony power. 
For a school district to possess complete monopsony power, potential 
teachers within its boundaries must possess no labor market opportunities 
other than those offered by the school district. These alternative labor 
market opportunities include employment with other public school 
districts, positions with private schools, and nonteaching positions. 
Or, if these alternative labor market opportunities exist but are 
relatively few in number, a monopsonistic result may still be obtained if 
these potential employers collude by refraining from competing with one 
another (Fleisher and Kniesner, 1984, p. 212). 
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There are a relatively small number of school districts in the state 
of Maryland. School district boundaries are coterminous with those of 
county governments. These school districts may possess a degree of 
monopsony power to the extent that potential teachers are geographically 
immobile between school districts and occupâtionally immobile between 
occupations in the county of their residence. Geographic mobility may be 
limited if teachers are secondary wage earners in a two-income family. 
Nationally, 87.3 percent of elementary teachers and 50.7 percent of 
secondary teachers were female in the 1956-1957 school year. Although 
the percent of teachers that are male trended upward over the subsequent 
years, in the 1972-1973 school years, still 84.1 percent of elementary 
teachers and 46.2 percent of secondary teachers were female (National 
Education Association, 1974, p. 10). Given this, school districts may 
possess a greater degree of monopsony power over elementary teachers than 
over secondary teachers. Occupational immobility tends to occur in 
markets where there are specialized job skills and limited alternative 
occupations that reward those skills (Link and Landon, 1975, p. 649). 
Other than the option of teaching in the private schools, public school 
teaching seems to fulfill those conditions in light of the educational 
preparation and certification requirements it entails. 
This chapter will first model teacher supply and school district 
demand for teacher services. Next, the procedure for model estimation 
will be discussed under the assumption that the school district possesses 
monopsony power. Finally, the empirical results will be derived and 
discussed. 
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B. Teacher and School District Behavior 
1. Teacher supply 
The model of teacher supply described below is similar to the model 
used by Boardman et al. (1982) in their search for monopsony power among 
Pennsylvania school districts. Based upon a paper by McFadden (1974, 
pp. 105-119), it is a multiple-choice model that describes an 
individual's choice of residence and occupation. 
Individuals possess a utility function which depends upon their 
income, p, a vector of job-environment characteristics, 5, a vector of 
locational characteristics, Y, and the characteristics of the individual 
that describe his or her tastes, A. Income is a function of the 
occupation, j, that the individual chooses (j = 1, ..., J), location 
choice, & (& = 1, L), and the individual's characteristics, a (a=l, 
..., A). Elements of 0 reflect the occupation and location an individual 
chooses, and Y describes the amenities and disamenities of his or her 
residential location. The utility function can thus be expressed as 
u = u[p(j, z, a), 0(j, i), ?(&), A^] = U[']; 
j = 1, —, J; & = 1, —, L; a = 1, ..., A. (5.1) 
Consistent with McFadden's model of population choice behavior, 
(5.1) can be rewritten as 
U  =  U [ * ]  =  V ( ' )  +  £ ( • )  (5.2) 
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where V(*), a nonstochasCic function, represents the normal, or standard, 
tastes of the population and e(*) reflects the manner in which the 
individual's tastes differ from the norm. McFadden specifies conditions 
under which the probability of an individual choosing a given alternative 
is functionally related to the "normal" utility derived from this 
alternative relative to the "normal" utility derived from all possible 
alternatives (McFadden, 1974, pp. 107-109). 
Multiplying this probability times the number of individuals in the 
labor market relates the expected number of individuals of a given type 
who are willing to supply their labor services to a particular location 
and occupation as a function of the arguments of the utility function. 
This function is transformed into a supply function of the form 
p(j, I, a) = g(q^(j. n, 0(j, A), ?(&), A^; 
j = 1, ..., J; & = 1, —, L; a = 1, —, A) (5.3) 
for all J occupations, L locations, and A types of individuals, q^^j, &) 
is the number of type-a individuals who are willing to supply their labor 
services to occupation j in location For a more detailed presentation 
of the above material, see Boardman et al. (1982) and McFadden (1974). 
2. Teacher demand 
Teacher demand is determined according to the same model used in 
Chapter III. The superintendent is charged with maximizing the average 
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level of educational services produced per student which is described by 
the function 
QC = Q(e^, Gg. 0p, Gg). (4.1) 
Again, is a vector of the number of teachers of each type per 
student, 0 is a vector of nonteacher school district characteristics, © 
s p 
is a vector of pupil characteristics, and, finally, ©^ is a vector of 
relevant home and community characteristics. The superintendent is given 
Bg, a budget of current educational expenditures. He maximizes (4.1) by 
allocating B^ among purchases of the services of the various types of 
teachers, here assumed to be the only input of the educational production 
function over which he has control. 
Demand functions for teacher services cannot be estimated within the 
current framework as monopsonists do not possess true demand curves for 
the monopsonized input. A reduced-form equation for teachers can be 
estimated. Its form will be discussed in the next section. 
3. Monopsonist model 
It is assumed that because of geographic and/or occupational 
immobility among potential teachers, each school district faces an 
upward-sloping supply curve of teacher services. Let the occupation of 
public school teaching be represented by j = 1. School district, or 
location & = 1, faces upward-sloping supply schedules for the A types of 
teachers. They are of the form 
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p(l, 1, a) = gCq^Cj, A), 0(j, &). ?(1), A,; 
j = 1, J; & = 1, L; a = 1, A). (5.4) 
The school superintendent maximizes (4.1) subject to the budget 
constraint, B^, and to the supply schedules of teachers which are of the 
form of equation (5.4). If the prices of teacher services were exogenous 
to the school district, then demand functions of the form 
q^d, 1) = f[p(l, 1, a), Bg/S, 0g, 0p, for a = 1, ..., A (5.5) 
could be estimated. This is not possible under the monopsony assumption 
as here the price of teacher services is endogenous to the school 
district. Actually, since the school district faces upward-sloping 
supply curves for the services of the various types of teachers, the 
marginal cost to the school district of employing another teacher is 
greater than the supply price of that teacher's services. This marginal 
factor cost increases with the number of teachers. The optimization 
process described above or, equivalently, the substitution of the supply 
function (5.4) into the demand function (5.5), yields an equation 
describing the optimal number of type-A teachers to be employed by School 
District One of the form 
*s' *p' Gn' G(i, 1), ?(*). A*; 
j = 1, ..., J; & = 1, L; a = 1, ..., A) (5.6) 
for a = 1, .., A (Boardman et al., 1982, p. 138). Equation (5.6) 
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differs from (5.5) in that instead of containing the price of teacher 
services, it contains the determinants of that supply price. It is again 
expected that B^/S, the per-pupil budget for current educational expense, 
should have a positive effect on the number of teachers per pupil. 0^, 
0 and are included to control for the effects of school, student, 
p u 
home, and community characteristics on the demand for teachers. Elements 
of 0(j, &) and ?(&) that cause the supply schedule of teachers to School 
District One to shift upwards to the left, which would imply a higher 
marginal cost of teacher services, are expected to have a negative effect 
on the optimal number of teachers. 
The supply functions of teacher services to School District One, 
represented by equation (5.4), can be estimated. They are determined 
within a simultaneous equation system composed of (5.4) and (5.6). The 
supply price of type "A" teachers to School District One is expected to 
increase as the number of type "A" teachers employed by that school 
district increases due to the upward-sloping supply schedule. The 
elements of 0(j, i) and ?(&) are included to control for job and location 
amenities and disamenities. The estimation of equations (5.4) and (5.6) 
will be discussed in the next section. 
C. Model Estimation 
1. Functional forms 
This section describes the estimation of the supply function of 
teacher services and the reduced-form equation for the teacher-student 
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ratio. All variables measured in dollars are in constant 1972 dollars. 
Supply functions for elementary teachers, secondary teachers, and all 
teachers, elementary and secondary combined, are estimated. In the 
interest of simplicity, all teachers at each schooling level will be 
considered as being of the same type. Consistent with equation (5.4), 
each function will be estimated as 
AVSALEL = P(PTES, ALTWG, PNW, VPROPEL, NPROMEL, CI, ..., C23, 
TREND), (5.7) 
AVSALHS = P(PTHS, ALTWG, PNW, VPROPHS, NPROMHS, CI, ..., C23, 
TREND), (5.8) 
and 
AVSALSD = P(PTS, ALTWG, PNW, VPROPSD, NPROMSD, CI, ..., C23, 
TREND). (5.9) 
The dependent variables, AVSALEL, AVSALHS, and AVSALSD, are the 
averages of actual salaries paid at the elementary level, the secondary 
level, and by the school district as a whole, respectively. PTES, PTES, 
and PTS are the numbers of teachers per student at the elementary level, 
the secondary level, and within the whole school district, respectively. 
If the school district does possess a degree of monopsony power and faces 
an upward-sloping supply curve of teacher services, then the number of 
teachers should have a positive effect on the price paid for teacher 
services. The number of teachers at each schooling level is divided by 
the appropriate student body size to control for district size. 
ALTWG, the alternative wage available to potential teachers is 
included to capture the effect of characteristics of other jobs on the 
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supply of teacher services. All else equal, the higher the price that 
teachers could receive by supplying their services to other occupations 
is, the higher is the expected price of teacher services. This is 
because the supply curve of teacher services which the school district 
faces shifts upward to the left. ÂLTWG was constructed from county-level 
data in the County and City Data Book (1952 and various years) and state-
level data from Employment, Hours, and Earnings. States and Areas (1972 
and various years). Observations of the average salaries of manufac­
turing, wholesale, retail, and selected services employees are available 
at the county level every four or five years over the period in which the 
models are estimated. Observations for the intervening years were 
interpolated for each county by using the trend in average manufacturing 
wages in the state of Maryland over the relevant four or five year 
period. ALTWG is expressed in 1972 dollars. 
The percent of the population served by the school district that is 
nonwhite, PNW, the value of school property and equipment per student 
within the elementary system, the secondary system, and the school 
district as a whole, VPROPEL, VPROPHS, and VPROPSD, respectively, and the 
percent of students not promoted at the elementary and secondary levels 
and the school district as a whole, NPROMEL, NPROMHS, and NPROMSD, 
respectively, are included to capture the effects of school district 
amenities and/or disamenities on the supply price of teachers. The 
expected coefficient signs on these variables are a priori ambiguous 
except for the value of school property and equipment per student. As in 
the previous chapter, it is expected that higher valued school facilities 
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Indicate a more pleasant work environment. This would cause the supply 
of teacher services to shift downward to the right, all else equal, 
lowering the supply price of teacher services. CI through C23 are zero-
one school district dummy variables defined as in the previous chapter 
such that 
They are included to control for the effect that unmeasured school 
district characteristics, locational or job-related, have on the supply 
price of teacher services. Finally, the time trend variable, TREND, is 
included to control for the effects of any unmeasured determinants of 
supply that change over time. 
Reduced-form equations for the teacher-student ratio will be 
estimated at the elementary level, the secondary level, and for the 
school district as a whole. These reduced-form equations contain as 
explanatory variables determinants of both teacher supply and demand. 
Since a monopsonist does not possess a true demand curve, only the 
reduced-form equation for teachers can be estimated. Consistent with 
equation (5.6), each reduced-form equation will be estimated as 
1 for the i-th school district, and 
(4.13) 
0 otherwise 
PTES = T(LOCFUND, OSFUND, PCAE, PNW, VPROPEL, TREND, ALTWG, 
NPROMEL, CI, ..., C23), (5.10) 
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PTES = T(LOCFUND, OSFUND, FYCOL, PNW, VPROPHS, TREND, ALTWG, 
NPROMHS, CI, C23), (5.11) 
PTS = T(LOCFDND, OSFUND, FYCOL, PNW, VPROPSD, TREND, ALTWG, 
NPROMSD, CI, ..., C23. (5.12) 
The dependent variables are the teacher-student ratios at the 
elementary and secondary levels, and for the school district as a whole, 
respectively. The budget measures, LOCFUND and OSFUND, represent the 
local and the combined state and federal funds for current educational 
expenditures, respectively. Both enter as demand-side determinants only 
and are expected to increase the teacher-student ratio. PCAE and PCA, 
the percent of pupils attending at the elementary level and within the 
school district as a whole, and FYCOL, the percent of the population 
served by the school district that has completed four or more years of 
college, are included to control for the effect that the student's home 
environment has on the demand for teachers. FYCOL is used at the 
secondary level instead of an attendance measure since attendance at the 
secondary level is likely to be a choice variable of students instead of 
being an indicator of the parent's attitude towards education. 
The percent of the population that is nonwhite, the value of school 
property and equipment per pupil, and the time trend variable are 
determinants of both the supply and the demand for teachers. Their 
expected signs of their parameter estimates are a priori ambiguous. 
ALTWG, the alternative wage available to teachers, was expected to have a 
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positive effect on the supply price of teachers and thus should have a 
negative effect on the teacher-student ratio. Finally, the nonpromotion 
measures and the school district dummy variables enter through the supply 
function as controls for job and locational amenities and disamenities. 
Their effects on the teacher-student ratio are a priori ambiguous. 
The reduced-form equations (5.10), (5.11), and (5.12) can be 
estimated with ordinary least squares. Since the number of teachers is 
not only a choice variable, but also is a determinant of the supply price 
of teachers, equations (5.7), (5.8), and (5.9) must be estimated using 
two-stage least squares. The model estimation procedures and empirical 
results from the monopsony model are presented in the next section. 
2. Empirical results 
This section discusses the empirical results from the estimation of 
equations (5.7) through (5.12). The estimation of the reduced-form 
equations for teachers was performed using ordinary least squares while 
the supply functions were estimated using two-stage least squares. Data 
were available for the 23 county school districts of Maryland for the 
1955-1956 through 1974-1975 school years. As in Chapter IV, the data set 
was broken down into two periods. The nonunion period spans the 1956 
through 1969 school years. No collective bargaining agreements between 
teachers' organizations and school districts existed during this period. 
The union period, 1970 through 1975, is a time when teachers in each of 
the 23 school districts were covered by a collective bargaining agreement 
negotiated between the school district and a National Education 
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Association-affiliated teachers' organization. The expectation is that 
if school districts did possess monopsony power, evidence of such should 
appear in the earlier period. To the extent that teachers' organizations 
were able to bargain successfully, it is expected that estimation of the 
monopsony model would fail to show evidence of monopsony power in the 
latter, unionized period. The results from the estimation of the teacher 
supply functions will be presented first, followed by the results from 
the estimation of the reduced-form equations for teachers. 
The presence of the teacher-student ratio in the supply functions 
required equations (5.7), (5.8), and (5.9) to be estimated with two-stage 
least squares. Regression results using data from the nonunionized 
period are presented in Table 25. Results using the unionized period 
data are presented in Table 26. The school district dummy variables were 
used to estimate the supply functions but their coefficient estimates are 
not presented here. Supply price functions for elementary teachers, 
secondary teachers, and for all teachers in the school district are 
estimated. The data from the nonunionized period were transformed to 
correct for positive first-order autocorrelation using Durbin's two-step 
correction procedure as described in Section B(3) of Chapter III. It was 
not necessary to transform the data from the unionized period. 
If school districts possess monopsony power in the market for 
teachers, both the number of teachers and the alternative wage are 
expected to have a positive effect on the supply price of teachers. This 
result is obtained using data from the nonunionized period as shown in 
Table 25. The number of teachers had a significant effect on the price 
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Table 25- Two—stage least squares estimation of the supply price of 
teacher services, nonunionized period (1956-1969) 
Dependent variables 
Independent AVSALEL ÂVSALHS AVSALSD 
variables (elementary) (secondary) (school district)* 
Intercept 4410.92 3021.86 3820.013 







ALTWG .176676 .0259758 .165246 
(1.7619)** (2.4259)* (1.8572)** 
PNW 23.706418 -24.158867 -6.052082 













TREND 93.889343 106.632250 100.231927 
(3.3066)* (5.2213)* (4.3954)* 
F 27.12 36.70 38.73 




D.W. 2.00 1.90 1.96 
n 290 290 290 
®t-statistics in parentheses. 
*Significant at five percent. 
••Significant at ten percent. 
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Table 26. Two-stage least squares estimation of the supply price of 
teacher services, unionized period (1970-1975) 
Dependent variables 
Independent ÂVSÂLEL ÂVSÂLHS ÂVSALSD 
variables (elementary) (secondary) (school district)* 
Intercept 14991.39 13114.88 11587.54 







ALTWG -.214036 .410100 .086680 
(-.8418) (1.5551) (.4221) 
PNW 18.487529 -91.690176 -32.477022 













TREND -183.339638 -43.376045 -130.032910 
(-4.2537)* (-1.2542) (-3.7513)* 
F 29.00 33.01 45.78 
R^ .88 .89 .92 
D.W. 2.11 2.21 2.07 
n 138 138 138 
^t-statistics in parentheses. 
*Significant at five percent. 
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of secondary teachers and on the supply price of teachers to the whole 
school district. The number of teachers had the expected sign in 
explaining the supply price of elementary teachers but only approached 
being significant at the ten percent level. The estimated supply 
elasticities, evaluated at the means, were all inelastic. The estimated 
supply elasticity measures for teachers to the elementary and secondary 
levels and to the whole school district were .15, .48, and .27, 
respectively. The supply of elementary teachers was estimated to be more 
inelastic than the supply of secondary teachers as was expected. 
However, it was surprising that the coefficient estimate for the number 
of elementary teachers did not have a stronger significant effect on the 
supply price of elementary teachers. The coefficient estimates for the 
alternative wage measure, ALTWG, were significant in all three supply 
equations. The value of school property and equipment was expected to 
capture the amenities of the work environment and to decrease the supply 
price of teachers. Coefficient estimates for this measure were negative 
in all cases but were significant only in explaining the supply price of 
secondary teachers. The time trend variable was strongly significant in 
all three regressions indicating that unmeasured supply determinants that 
changed over the period had a positive effect on the supply price of 
teacher services. 
Regression results using data from the unionized period are 
presented in Table 26. They differ substantially from the results of the 
nonunion period. None of the coefficient estimates for the number of 
teachers are significant in explaining teacher supply prices and they 
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have the wrong sign in two of the three regressions. The alternative 
wage has the expected sign and approaches significance in explaining the 
supply price of secondary teachers- However, it has the wrong sign in 
the regression for elementary teachers and is not significant in that 
regression or in the estimation of the supply price of teachers to the 
whole school district. Finally, the time trend variable indicates that 
unmeasured supply determinants caused the real supply price to decrease 
over the period, this effect being significant in two of the three 
regressions. 
An alternative measure of monopsony power was constructed and used 
to estimate the supply price of teachers. Results using data from the 
nonunion period are presented in Table 27. Again, two-stage least 
squares is used and the data are transformed to correct for positive 
first-order autocorrelation. 
This alternative measure controls for district size and attempts to 
capture the effect of the size of the pool of potential teachers on the 
supply price of teachers. The number of teachers at the elementary 
level, the secondary level, and in the whole school district, T^, T^, and 
TgQ, respectively, are divided by the number of individuals in the 
population served by the school district who are 25 or more years old and 
who have completed four or more years of college. The size of this 
group, PP, is used to proxy the number of individuals Who could 
potentially supply their services to the school district. It is expected 
that larger values of T^/PP, T^/PP, and T^^/PP would indicate that the 
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Table 27. Two-stage least squares estimation of the supply price of 
teacher services, nonunionized period (1956 -1969) 
Dependent variables 
Independent AVSALEL ÂVSALHS AVSALSD 
variables (elementary) (secondary) (school district)* 
Intercept 3709.049 6368.879 3763.832 







ALTWG .153417 .136656 .112674 
(1.6012) (1.3398) (1.3765) 
PNW 29.985183 -19.472998 -1.261777 













TREND 123.675219 172.713724 146.893959 
(9.9423)* (13.6312)* (13.4711)* 
F 28.82 37.48 44.92 
R^ .75 .79 .83 
D.W. 1.93 1.79 1.82 
n 293 293 293 
^t-statistics in parentheses. 
•Significant at five percent. 
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school district is operating further along the respective teacher supply 
schedule, implying a higher price of teacher services. 
These measures have the expected positive sign in all of the 
regressions in Table 25, but only Tg^/PP has significant explanatory 
power in the estimation of the supply price of teachers to the whole 
school district. Although the alternative wage measure only approaches 
significance in one regression, its coefficient estimates are positive in 
all three regressions. The coefficient estimates for the remaining 
variables have the same signs as those in the regressions using the 
teacher-student ratios except for the one on VPROPEL. However, this 
variable had no explanatory power in either of the regressions in which 
it appeared. Supply functions were estimated using data from the union 
period, the 1970 through 1975 school years. They are not reported here 
as only the intercept terms and the school district dummy variables had 
significant explanatory power. 
The reduced-form equations for elementary teachers, secondary 
teachers, and all teachers combined were estimated using data from the 
nonunion and the union periods. Only results for the whole school 
district are presented in Table 28 as they are essentially the same as 
the results found for elementary and secondary teachers separately. The 
data from the nonunion period had to be transformed to correct for 
positive first-order autocorrelation using Durbin's two-step correction 
procedure. 
The budget measures, LOCFITND and OSFUND, enter as demand-side 
determinants. Consistent with expectations, they had a significant 
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Table 28. Estimation of the reduced-form equation for teachers at the 
































































^t-statistics in parentheses. 
*Significant at five percent. 
**Significant at ten percent. 
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positive effect on teachers in both periods. The alternative wage 
measure was expected to have a negative effect on the number of teachers 
since a higher value for it implies a higher price of teachers. This 
result was obtained in the nonunion period, but only approached 
significance at the ten percent level. The alternative wage measure had 
the wrong sign using the unionized period data. The result is not 
surprising since estimation of the teacher supply functions gave no 
evidence of school districts possessing monopsony power in the unionized 
period. Finally, the time trend variable indicated that unmeasured 
supply and demand determinants caused the teacher-student ratio to 
increase over both periods. 
D. Conclusion 
This chapter tested for monopsony power in the market for public 
school teachers in the state of Maryland over the 1956 through 1975 
school years. A supply function for teacher services was modeled and 
estimated using two-stage least squares. The data set was broken down 
into a nonunion and a union period, expecting that if monopsony power did 
exist, evidence of such would be more likely to be found in the nonunion 
period. 
Empirical results from the estimation of teacher supply functions 
using the nonunion period data were consistent with the monopsony 
hypothesis as both the number of teachers and the alternative wage had a 
positive effect on the price of teacher services. It was expected that 
elementary school systems might possess a greater degree of monopsony 
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power than secondary systems as the predominantly female makeup of their 
teacher stock made potential elementary teachers more geographically 
immobile than potential secondary teachers. Although elementary teachers 
were estimated to have a more inelastic supply than secondary teachers, 
the coefficient estimate on the number of elementary teachers only 
approached having significant power in explaining the supply price of 
elementary teachers in the nonunion period. No evidence of monopsony 
power was found in the union period. This could be interpreted to mean 
that teacher organizations were successful in combatting the previously 
held market power of school districts in the market for teacher services. 
If unions were able to successfully counter the monopsony power of school 
districts, it would be expected that teachers would receive a higher 
price for their services and school districts would hire more teachers in 
the union period relative to the nonunion period. A relative teacher 
wage measure, the average salary to teachers in the school district 
divided by the alternative wage available to individuals residing within 
the school district, was calculated for the six years prior to 
unionization, 1964-1969, and for the first six years in which unions were 
in place, 1970-1975. Relative teacher wages in the union period were 3.1 
percent higher than those in the nonunion period. Also, the average 
teacher-student ratio was 9.2 percent higher in the union period than in 
the nonunion period. However, this evidence is only consistent with the 
monopsony story, it is not conclusive proof of it as other factors may 
have been affecting relative wages and teacher-student ratios through the 
period. Finally, reduced-form equations were estimated for the two 
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periods. The results found were consistent with those from the 
estimation of the teacher supply functions. 
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VI. SUMMARY 
A. Overview of the Empirical Results 
Chapter III was generally successful in modeling and estimating the 
demand for teachers. Results were consistent with the assumed maximizing 
behavior of a school district administrator. Three measures of the price 
of teacher services were used in the estimation of teacher demand and one 
of those measures, the average of actual salaries paid, had consistently 
negative, and for the most part significant, effects on the demand for 
teacher services. There were some unexpected results, for instance the 
measure of state and local current educational funds had a negative and 
significant effect on the demand for teachers in a number of regressions. 
This may have been due to the simple approach taken towards budget 
determination in the model, assuming it to be exogenous. Consistent with 
previous studies employing similar methodology, the demand for teachers 
was found to be price inelastic. This result was obtained for the school 
district as a whole, for the elementary and secondary systems, and across 
small, medium, and large school districts. Elasticities varied for the 
different groups but all were within a fairly narrow bound. No pattern 
to such variation was discerned. Regressions estimating the demand for 
teacher experience and education levels were less successful than those 
estimating numbers of teachers in terms of the R-squared values and t-
statistics that resulted. This was not surprising in light of the small 
changes from year to year in the average experience and education levels. 
The results were superior to previous studies in that the demand for 
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these teacher attributes was found to be negatively and significantly 
related to their prices in a number of the regressions, contrary to the 
results the other studies had achieved. 
Chapter IV examined the possiblity that teachers were willing to 
accept a lower price for their services in exchange for better work 
conditions, focusing on the effects of smaller class sizes. No evidence 
was found of such a tradeoff in the 1961 through 1969 school years, a 
period when the 23 school districts were nonunionized. However, evidence 
of such a tradeoff was found during the 1970 through 1972 school years 
when collective bargaining agreements were in place between each of the 
school districts and a certified teachers' union. Both elementary and 
secondary teachers were found to be willing to accept lower prices for 
their services in exchange for smaller average class sizes. 
Finally, Chapter V searched for evidence of monopsony power in the 
market for public school teachers. iSo such evidence was found using data 
from 1970 through 1975, a period when collective bargaining agreements 
existed between teachers' unions and each of the 23 school districts. 
However, during the period from 1956 through 1969, when no such agree­
ments existed, evidence consistent with the hypothesized monopsony power 
of school districts was found. It should be stressed that this proof was 
not conclusive as the source of the monopsony power—geographical and/or 
occupational immobility, could not be identified. 
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B. Policy Implications 
The demand for teachers was found to be price-inelastic across 
schooling levels and school district sizes using data from the 1958 
through 1980 school years. The estimated elasticities were actually 
"partial" price elasticities to use Ehrenberg's terminology (Ehrenberg, 
1973, pp. 373-377), since the size of the budget was not allowed to vary 
in response to changes in the price of teacher services. Ehrenberg found 
that state educational budgets increased in response to an increase in 
the price of educational manpower. If such an effect were to hold here, 
then the estimated price elasticities would serve as upper bound 
estimates on the absolute value of the whole (variable budget) price 
elasticity of demand for teachers. 
An inelastic demand for teachers implies that teachers' unions may 
be able to achieve substantial pay increases for their members while 
suffering relatively small disemployment effects. Such a result could 
serve to further strain the budgets of local governments. However, 
several forces may act to restrain this effect. First, teachers' unions 
may not have sufficient bargaining power to achieve substantial wage 
increases. Laws in many states, including Maryland, prohibit public 
school teachers from using the strike as a tool in the bargaining 
process. Secondly, the results of Chapter IV suggest that teachers may 
be willing to tradeoff monetary remuneration in return for pleasant job 
characteristics. Individuals bargaining in the school district's behalf 
should be aware of the tradeoffs that teachers are willing to make 
between wages and working conditions and the costs to the school 
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districts of providing these amenities. By knowing the value placed upon 
various amenities by teachers and the costs to the school district of 
providing these amenities, the school district's representatives may be 
able to negotiate for a less costly employment package, consisting of pay 
and job characteristics, than would otherwise be arrived at. Finally, in 
the long run, school districts may be able to increase the price 
elasticity of demand for teachers by increasing the substitution 
possibilities between teachers and other educational inputs. For 
instance, as computer software improves, school districts may find it 
increasingly attractive to substitute towards computer-assisted instruc­
tion. 
The final policy implication relates to state educational aid 
formulas designed to distribute state educational dollars so as to 
achieve equality of educational opportunity across school districts for 
comparable levels of tax effort by local residents. Suppose that equal 
educational opportunity results from equal student access to identifiable 
inputs into the educational process, teaching being one of those inputs. 
A formula designed to give school districts equal ability to purchase 
these inputs for a given level of tax effort requires that if prices of 
these inputs vary across school districts, the sources of such variation 
must be identified and incorporated into the aid formula if it is to be 
effective in achieving its goal. Chapter IV suggested that class sizes 
and the value of school facilities are two factors that cause the price 
of teacher services to vary. The school district dummy variables further 
suggest that interdistrict differences in the cost of living and 
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locational and job-related amenities and disamenities might also be 
considered in the determination of such a formula. 
C. Future Research 
The results of this study suggest several areas of future research. 
One extension would involve endogenizing the budget determination 
process, possibly by formally incorporating a median-voter framework into 
the analysis. Data describing the gross income and state and federal 
income tax payments by school district residents are available from the 
early 1960s to the present. Additional data describing property tax 
rates, the price of alternative government services, and community tastes 
and preferences would be needed. With this, the demand for teachers 
would be determined simultaneously with the determination of the 
community's demand for public education. This would allow for the 
measurement of the "whole" price elasticity of the demand for teachers, 
that is the response of the quantity of teachers demanded to their price, 
allowing the budget to vary in response to the change in the price of 
teacher services. At the same time, the level of outside educational 
funds could be more carefully modeled, accounting for those that are 
matching and those that are nonmatching. This might serve to indicate 
why the outside funding measure had an unexpected negative effect on the 
demand for teachers in some of the regressions in Chapter III. 
A second extension would involve finding better data on the supply 
side of the market, for instance measures that would capture interschool 
district differences in the cost of living and locational amenities and 
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disamenîties better than the school district dummy variables employed 
here. Also, it would be useful to get observations on individual 
teachers and schools as opposed to the school district averages employed 
here. Hopefully, this would allow for a more accurate estimation of the 
price-characteristics function derived in Chapter IV and the supply 
function of teacher services derived in Chapter V. It should also allow 
for the measurement of the different supply responses of various types of 
teachers, for instances males versus females, whites versus nonwhites, 
graduates of higher ranked colleges versus those from less pretigious 
institutions, new teachers versus experienced teachers, and the like. 
Also, the identification of the sources of teacher price differentials 
across school districts would allow for the construction of a more 
accurate state educational aid formula. 
A third possibility would be to model school district behavior 
within a dynamic framework, focusing on the relationships among teacher 
demand, teacher turnover, and the price of teacher services. In this 
study, evidence was found of a relationship between teachers and the 
price of teacher services with Chapters IV and V suggesting that 
causality may flow in both directions. Teacher prices are also likely to 
affect turnover. If school districts face costs of adjusting their stock 
of teachers, say through hiring and training costs, then there is also 
likely to be a relationship among turnover, the price of teacher 
services, and teacher demand. For instance, school districts may opt to 
increase their teacher pay levels in order to reduce turnover up to the 
point where at the margin the increased salary expenditures are equal to 
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the decreased costs of teacher turnover. This would allow for the 
examination of school district responses to expected enrollment changes 
and to projected changes in the supply of teachers. 
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